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INTRODUCTION

The state action doctrine is somewhat of a mystery to law students,
legal scholars, lawyers, and judges. It is a key component of the
Fourteenth Amendment-a threshold requirement that must be satisfied
before triggering protection of our fundamental rights-but the doctrine
itself seems to be curiously without purpose, a collection of arbitrary
rules that impede constitutional protection of liberty, equality, and
fairness for no good reason. Nearly forty years ago, Professor Charles
Black called the state action doctrine "a conceptual disaster area"1 and
characterized scholarly commentary upon it as "a torchless search for a
way out of a damp echoing cave.",2 More recently other legal scholars
have described the state action doctrine as "analytically incoherent ' 3 and
"a miasma."'4 The reason that the state action doctrine is considered to be
so inscrutable is that the purpose of the doctrine has been misunderstood.

1. Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword. "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's
Proposition14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967).
2. Id.
3. Gary Peller & Mark Tushnet, State Action anda New Birth of Freedom,92 GEO. L.J. 779,
789 (2004) ("The state action doctrine is analytically incoherent because, as Hohfeld and Hale
demonstrated, state regulation of so-called private conduct is always present, as a matter of analytic
necessity, within a legal order.").
4. Alan R. Madry, State Action and the Due Process of Self-Help: FlaggBros. Redux, 62 U.
PITT. L. REv. 1, 2 (2000).
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THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE

The purpose of this Article is to explain what the rationale behind the
state action doctrine is.
The Supreme Court has badly misinterpreted the purpose of the
state action doctrine. In 1982, in the case of Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co.,5 the Court stated: "Careful adherence to the 'state action'
requirement preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the
reach of federal law and federal judicial power.",6 Different justices of
the Supreme Court repeated this understanding of the purpose of the
doctrine in 1988 in National Collegiate Athletic Association v.
Tarkanian,7 in 2000 in United States v. Morrison,8 and in 2001 in
Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Association.9 The Court has got it exactly wrong. The purpose of the
state action doctrine is not to "preserve an area of individual freedom."
That is the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, the state
action doctrine functions as a limitation upon the operation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court's justification of the state action doctrine is
demonstrably wrong because individuals and private organizations do
not have a constitutional right to operate free of constitutional norms
mandating equality, fairness, and tolerance. Privately-owned restaurants
do not have a constitutional right to discriminate on the basis of race;' °
privately-owned utilities do not have a constitutional right to shut off a
customer's electrical service without notice and an opportunity to be

5. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
6. Id.at 936. See also G. Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State Action
Doctrine: The Search for Governmental Responsibility, 34 Hous. L. REv. 333, 339-40 (1997):
Why does the state action doctrine matter, and why does it merit the extensive attention
it has received from courts and scholars? It matters because it is a core doctrine in our
nation's constitutional framework. It is the tool with which the courts attempt to balance
at least three competing interests: (1)individual autonomy-the individual's interest in
preserving broad areas of life in which he or she can develop and act without being
subjected to the restraints placed by the Constitution on governmental action, (2)
federalism-the nation's interest in preserving the proper balance between state and
national power, especially the power of states to determine, within generous limits, the
extent to which regulatory power should be applied to private action, and (3)
constitutional rights-the interest in protecting constitutional rights against invasion by
government or by action fairly attributable to government.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
7. 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988).
8. 529 U.S. 598, 622 (2000).
9. 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001); id. at 306 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
10. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 726 (1961) (finding state action
because privately-owned restaurant was operated on property leased from the government).
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heard;"' and private athletic associations do not have a constitutional
right to infringe upon their members' right to freedom of speech. 12 Equal
treatment, fundamental fairness, and tolerance among individuals may
be mandated if the people, acting through the democratic process,
choose to enact these principles into law. The state action doctrine does
not protect the rights of individuals to be free of governmental control,
but rather the right of the people to democratically determine, for
themselves, what kind of society they wish to live in. It is not respect for
the rights of the individual,but respect for democracy, that is at stake in
the state action cases.
Just as the Supreme Court has misconstrued the state action
doctrine by interpreting it too narrowly, a number of progressive legal
scholars have also misunderstood it and have construed the doctrine too
broadly. A common argument from this viewpoint is that "state action is
always present" because background principles of contract, tort, and
property law unfairly give advantage to powerful individuals and
organizations. 13 Another common claim of progressive scholars is that
the Constitution imposes upon the government the affirmative duty to
protect its citizens from hunger, cold, and disease. 14 In my opinion, both
sides are in error, and this Article will expose the errors of both sides in
their understanding, interpretation, and application of the state action
doctrine.
Contributing to the difficulty is that the state action doctrine is
actually not one doctrine, but four related strands of doctrine. One aspect15
of the doctrine distinguishes "state action" from "private action."'
Another strand marks the difference between "state action" and "state
inaction."' 16 A third application of the doctrine depends upon the
distinction between "mere repeal of a law" and "distortion of the
11. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (finding that privately-owned
electrical utility was not a state actor).
12.

Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 290-91 (2001)

(finding that private non-profit athletic association was a state actor because it was effectively
controlled by officials and employees of the state).
13.

See generally Cass R. Sunstein, State Action Is Always Present, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 465

(2002); LouIs MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 68 (1996); Liliya Abramchayev, A Social Contract Argument for the
State's Duty to Protectfrom Private Violence, 18 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 849, 863 (2004)

("State action is pervasive and its traces can be found in the background of any situation."); Peller &
Tushnet, supra note 3, at 789 ("There is no region of social life that even conceptually can be
marked off as 'private' and free from governmental regulation.").
14. See infra Part IV.B.
15. See discussion infra Part III.
16. See discussion infra Part IV.
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governmental process." 17 The fourth aspect of the state action doctrine is
its effect upon the power of Congress to enforce the Due Process Clause
and the Equal Protection Clause under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' 8
Part II of this Article proposes that the true purpose of the state
action doctrine is to serve the principle of democratic choice, in that the
doctrine carves out certain fields within which the people have the right
to democratically govern themselves.1 9 Parts III, IV, V, and VI,
respectively, explain how an accurate understanding of the purpose of
the state action doctrine would affect the analysis of the "state
action/private action" dichotomy, 0 the "state action/state inaction"
structure"
governmental
repeal/alter
the
"mere
dichotomy, 21
22
and the state action component of Section 5 of the
dichotomy,
Fourteenth Amendment.23 Part VII argues that the constitutional theories
of Alexander Bickel and John Hart Ely support my proposed
understanding of the purpose of the state action doctrine. 24 I conclude
that the state action doctrine should be interpreted in light of the
principle of democratic choice.
II.

THE TRUE PURPOSE OF THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE

In my opinion, both liberals and conservatives are mistaken in their
interpretation of the state action doctrine because both sides misperceive
the purpose of the doctrine. Conservatives are in error because the state
action doctrine was not intended to be used to protect individual rights or
states' rights.2 5 Liberals are in error because the Constitution was not
intended to be used to regulate the behavior of individuals, 2 6 nor does it
guarantee governmental benefits. 27 Instead, the state action doctrine
stands for the proposition that the people have the right to determine for
themselves, through their state and federal elected representatives, how
individuals are to treat each other and how generous society will be in
the distribution of wealth when it acts collectively. The state action
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See discussion infra Part V.
See discussion infra Part VI.
See infra notes 25-41 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 42-100 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 10 1-85 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 185-221 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 222-341 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 342-66 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra Part IIl.
See discussion infra Part III.
See discussion infra Part [V.A.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2006

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [2006], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 34:1379

doctrine is neither a barrier to governmental control of private parties, as
conservatives imagine it to be, nor a replacement for the democratic
process, as liberals would have it.
The Constitution is based upon the once revolutionary but now
commonplace idea that the people of this Nation are sovereign. "We, the
people... ordain[ed] and establish[ed]" the government of the United
States,28 following the principle that was announced in the Declaration
of Independence that governments are instituted for the purpose of
securing people's inalienable rights, and that all just powers of
government are derived from the consent of the governed.29 The people
of the United States do not serve the government; rather, the government
serves the people. 30 It is for this reason that the government may not
invade the fundamental rights of the people. In a hierarchy of
constitutional values, the rights of the people trump the powers of
government, and therefore governmental action is subject to people's
fundamental rights. 3 1 The state action doctrine emerges from and
reinforces these fundamental principles of American government, in that
the doctrine requires governmental action to be subject to judicial
review.
Constitutional law is central to our society and our system of law. It
establishes a democracy governed by majority rule, but it also protects
against what Alexis de Toqueville and John Stuart Mill called a "tyranny
of the majority." 32 Our inalienable rights of equality, liberty, and fairness
are protected from interference even when-especially when-the
majority of the people wish to violate those rights. And because the

28.

U.S. CONST. pmbl.

29.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

30.

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining the relationship between

the legislature and the people in the course of arguing that legislative acts which are inconsistent
with the Constitution are invalid). Hamilton stated:
There is no position which depends on clearer principles, than that every act of a
delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised,
is void. No legislative act therefore contrary to the constitution can be valid. To deny this
would be to affirm that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the servant is above
his master; that the representatives of the people are superior to the people themselves;
that men acting by virtue of powers may do not only what their powers do not authorize,
but what they forbid.
Id.
31.

See RONALD DwORK1N, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1977) ("Individual rights are

political trumps held by individuals.").
32.

See generally ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA ch. XV (discussing the

"tyranny of the majority" in a chapter entitled, "Unlimited Power of the Majority in the United
States and its Consequences"); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 5-6 (W.W. Norton & Co. ed.
1975).
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Constitution is regarded as law, the duty to enforce its prohibitions
against state action is the responsibility of the courts.3 3
But there are circumstances where the Constitution does not apply,
or where it applies in only weakened form. For example, two doctrines
that inhibit the courts from subjecting certain laws or governmental
actions to rigorous constitutional review are the political question
doctrine and the doctrine of governmental intent. The political question
doctrine identifies a number of subjects that must be resolved only
through the political process. Under this doctrine, matters such as the
impeachment of public officials and a number of matters relating to
military and foreign policy are either not reviewable by the judiciary or
are reviewable only under a very deferential standard of review.34 The
doctrine of governmental intent is concerned with the motivation of the
person or entity whose actions are being reviewed.3 5 It imposes a lower
level of constitutional scrutiny upon, and consequently vests more
discretion in, actors who do not intentionally target certain
constitutionally protected groups or freedoms. 36 The state action
doctrine, like the political question doctrine and the doctrine of
governmental intent, shields certain categories of conduct from
constitutional review.

33. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (recognizing the constitution as "the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation" and stating, "[ilt is emphatically the province and the
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is").
34. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 238 (1993) (ruling that question of
procedure to be followed in trial of impeachment is committed to sole discretion of Senate, and is
therefore a political question); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring) (stating that question as to constitutionality of action by President unilaterally
abrogating a treaty constituted a political question); David J. Bederman, Deference or Deception:
Treaty Rights as Political Questions, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1439, 1446 (1999) (describing spectrum
of deference in different types of questions involving the interpretation of treaties).
35. See Wilson R. Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionalityof Laws that Are Both Content-Based
and Content Neutral: The Emerging Constitutional Calculus, 79 IND. L.J. 801, 817-27 (2004)
(summarizing doctrine of governmental intent and analyzing its application in freedom of
expression cases); see generally STEPHEN E. GOTTLIEB, MORALITY IMPOSED: THE REHNQUIST
COURT AND LIBERTY IN AMERICA (2000) (criticizing doctrine of governmental intent).

36. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney 442 U.S. 256, 281 (1979) (upholding state statute
against equal protection claim on ground that there was no governmental intent to discriminate on
the basis of gender); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984) (upholding inclusion of nativity
scene in public holiday display against Establishment Clause challenge in part because "there is
insufficient evidence to establish that the inclusion of the creche is a purposeful or surreptitious
effort to express some kind of subtle governmental advocacy of a particular religious message").
See generally Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (upholding municipal
regulation against First Amendment challenge on ground that laws which are intended to serve
content-neutral purposes are subjected to a lower level of scrutiny than laws intended to regulate
content).
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The state action doctrine has four related applications. First, it
focuses in part upon whose actions are subject to constitutional review,
namely actions that are attributable to government. This aspect of the
doctrine normally prohibits constitutional review of the actions of
private individuals or organizations. 37 The second feature of the state
action doctrine distinguishes between two types of governmental actions,
affirmative acts and failures to act, and declares that only the former
may qualify as violations of constitutional rights.38 Consequently, the
state action doctrine does not require the government to adopt laws
which forbid private acts of discrimination, nor does it require the
government to enact social welfare programs. 39 Third, the state action
doctrine creates the notion of a "constitutional baseline," and it allows
the government to return to the constitutional baseline by repealing
antidiscrimination laws and social welfare programs. At the same time, it
prohibits the adoption of any governmental process which makes it more
difficult for some people to seek the aid of the government than for
others. 40 And fourth, the state action doctrine is employed to limit the
power of Congress in the enforcement and protection of our fundamental
rights.4 1
I propose that in all four of these areas the state action doctrine
should serve a single, overriding purpose: constitutional respect for
democratic choice. In other words, the state action doctrine contributes
to the right of the people to govern themselves. Accordingly, it should be
interpreted in light of its purpose and should be applied only in cases
where it would make a significant contribution to democratic principles.
I conclude that the Supreme Court has applied the state action doctrine
in ways that did not serve the principle of democratic choice, leading to
erroneous interpretations of the Constitution. I also conclude that,
properly understood, the state action doctrine is analytically coherent,
and that the criticism leveled at the doctrine by several progressive
scholars is not justified.
The next four sections of this Article each describe one aspect of
the state action doctrine and analyze the application of the doctrine by
the Supreme Court and by progressive critics of the Court. I suggest that
in several cases the Court and its critics have misunderstood and
misapplied the state action doctrine because they have failed to be
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See
See
See
See
See

discussion
discussion
discussion
discussion
discussion

infra Part
infra Part
infra Part
infra Part
infra Part

Ill.
IV.
IV.
IV.A.
IV.
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guided by its overriding purpose-the preservation of democratic
choice.
III.

THE "STATE ACTION/PRIVATE ACTION" DICHOTOMY

The first aspect of the state action doctrine emphasizes the word
state, ,6,42
and itith
itisthe idea that, with but one exception, the Constitution
does not prescribe how private individuals or private organizations are
to treat each other; rather, only43governmental action is subject to the
requirements of the Constitution.
A.

Textual Basisfor the "State Action/PrivateAction" Dichotomy

The text of the original Constitution unambiguously establishes that
it is a law governing government, not individuals. Articles I, II, and III
establish the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the federal
government, while Article I, Sections 9 and 10, and Article IV identify a
number of limitations that are imposed upon the federal and state
governments. 4 Similarly, the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment are phrased as limitations upon the power of government.
The First Amendment begins with the words, "Congress shall make no
law,"945 and the Fourteenth Amendment commences with the words, "No
state shall make or enforce any law."46 Furthermore, it was the
understanding of the framers of the Constitution that the document was
intended as a blueprint for the government.4 7 Chief Justice John
42. See Robin West, Response to State Action and a New Birth of Freedom, 92 GEO. L.J. 819,
824 (2004) [hereinafter West, Response] (noting that the state action doctrine encompasses two
different concepts, and stating, "[i]n the first interpretation, the emphasis is on the state-the idea is
that the Constitution restrains states rather than private parties").
43. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment
"erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful").
44. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (creating Congress); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (creating
Presidency); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (creating Supreme Court and authorizing creation of lower
courts); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (limiting powers of federal and state governments); U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 10 (limiting powers of state governments); U.S. CONST. art. IV (imposing various limits and
obligations upon state and federal governments).
45. U.S. Const. amend. I.
46. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § I.
47. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (1788), available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/federal/fed51.htm (discussing the necessity for separating the
powers of government). Madison stated:
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be
connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human
nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But
what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men
were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither
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Marshall, who must be regarded among the framers,48 observed in the
foundation case of Marbury v. Madison49 that the Constitution
"organizes the government, and assigns, to different departments, their
respective powers. ' 0
In contrast, the Constitution does not purport to determine how one
person is to treat another. So far as the Constitution is concerned, one
individual may steal the possessions of another, assault another person,
even commit murder, and it is not a violation of the Constitution. The
sole exception to this generalization is the commandment contained
within the Thirteenth Amendment. 51 In light of the history of our Nation,
there is one thing that no person may do to anyone else: under the
Constitution, no person may enslave another. 52 But aside from cases
involving slavery, in cases arising under the Constitution, the state action
doctrine makes it necessary to determine whether the act complained of
was committed by the government or by a private individual.
B.

Critique of the Supreme Court'sDistinctionBetween State Action
and PrivateAction

In most cases it is obvious whether or not the act complained of
was "state action" or "private action." The adoption and enforcement of
laws and the promulgation and application of policies by public officials
clearly constitute state action, while in the vast majority of civil and

external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a
government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in
this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place
oblige it to control itself.
Id.
48. See
The
Library
of
Virginia:
John
Marshall,
http://www.lva.lib.va.
us/whoweare/exhibits/marshall/ (last visited July 7, 2005) (stating that in June 1788, Marshall
served as a member of the Virginia convention ratifying the United States Constitution).
49. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
50. Id.at 176. Marshall stated:
This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns, to different
departments, their respective powers. It may either stop here; or establish certain limits
not to be transcended by those departments.
The government of the United States is of the latter description. The powers of the
legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or
forgotten, the constitution is written.
Id.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.").
52. Id.
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criminal cases it is equally clear that the actions of the defendants are
wholly private acts, from common automobile accidents to the
employment policies of giant corporations. But there are many cases
where it is unclear whether the act complained of was committed by the
government or by a private individual. These are cases where private
parties are at least arguably imbued with governmental power, and have
allegedly abused that power.
The factual circumstances of the state action cases are varied and
diverse, and accordingly, the standards that have evolved to resolve
these cases are equally varied and diverse. The Supreme Court has
generally stated that a private party will be considered a "state actor" in
cases where the government was "significantly involved" in the actions
of the defendant, 53 or, considering the matter from another perspective,
where the actions of the defendant are "fairly attributable" to the
government.54 As recurring patterns of relationships between private and
governmental bodies have been evaluated under these two general
standards, the Supreme Court has identified a number of subcategories
of state action. For every pattern of state action that the Court has
defined, it has articulated a rule for determining whether or not the
behavior in question constitutes state action. Furthermore, for every fact
pattern and accompanying rule of inclusion within the concept of state
action, the Court has also recognized an antithesis that does not
constitute state action. The rule defining "state action" for each fact
pattern is described below in terms of its antithesis and its thesis.
The Supreme Court has determined that when one person enters
into a contract with another person, or performs such a contract, this
alone does not constitute state action.5 5 However, when a person invokes
the power of the judicial system to enforce a contract, this does

53. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) ("[P]rivate
conduct abridging individual rights does no violence to the Equal Protection Clause unless to some

significant extent the State in any of its manifestations has been found to have become involved in
it."); Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177 (1972) ("[T]he operation of the regulatory scheme
enforced by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board does not sufficiently implicate the State in the
discriminatory guest policies of Moose Lodge to make the latter 'state action .... ').
54.

See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (ruling that private

party's resort to ex parte judicial attachment procedure constitutes state action, and stating, "[olur
cases have accordingly insisted that the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right
be fairly attributable to the State").
55.

See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 ("We conclude, therefore, that the restrictive

agreements standing alone cannot be regarded as violative of any rights guaranteed to petitioners by
the Fourteenth Amendment. So long as the purposes of those agreements are effectuated by
voluntary adherence to their terms, it would appear clear that there has been no action by the State
and the provisions of the Amendment have not been violated.").
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constitute state action, and the enforcement of the contract must conform
to both procedural and substantive requirements of the Constitution.5 6
Similarly, where the law merely acquiesces in or recognizes a
preexisting right or power in an individual, this is not state action.57
However, where the government coerces, encourages, or influences one
individual to invade the rights of another, it is state action. 58 Merely
entering into a contract with the government to provide goods or
services is not state action, 59 but the performance of public functions that
have heretofore been exclusively performed by government is state
action. 6 0 Being the subject of government regulation or the recipient of
government funding is not sufficient, in and of itself, to turn a private
actor into a state actor,6' but forging a partnership with the government
56. See, e.g., id. at 19-20 (holding that the enforcement of restrictive covenant by state court
constitutes state action); Lugar, 457 U.S. at 942 (1982) (finding state action to be present "when the
State has created a system whereby state officials will attach property on the ex parte application of
one party to a private dispute").
57. See, e.g., Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978) (finding no state action
where warehouseman threatened to sell stored goods pursuant to state statute authorizing self-help,
stating that "[t]his Court, however, has never held that a State's mere acquiescence in a private
action converts that action into that of the State").
58. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 381 (1967) ("The California Supreme Court
believes that the section will significantly encourage and involve the State in private
discriminations. We have been presented with no persuasive considerations indicating that these
judgments should be overturned.").
59. See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-41 (1982) (finding private school
which contracted with public schools to teach children with behavior handicaps did not engage in
state action when it terminated employment of teachers).
The school, like the nursing homes, is not fundamentally different from many private
corporations whose business depends primarily on contracts to build roads, bridges,
dams, ships, or submarines for the government. Acts of such private contractors do not
become acts of the government by reason of their significant or even total engagement in
performing public contracts.
Id.
60. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507 (1946) (finding company town subject to
requirements of First Amendment, and stating, "whether a corporation or a municipality owns or
possesses the town the public in either case has an identical interest in the functioning of the
community in such manner that the channels of communication remain free"); Terry v. Adams, 345
U.S. 461, 475-76 (1953) (finding that a political association's pre-primary election constitutes state
action); Smith v. Allright, 321 U.S. 649, 663 (1944) (holding that a political party's primary
election constitutes state action).
61. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974) ("The mere fact that a
business is subject to state regulation does not by itself convert its action into that of the State for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor does the fact that the regulation is extensive and
detailed, as in the case of most public utilities, do so.") (citations omitted); Moose Lodge v. Irvis,
407 U.S. 163, 176-77 (1972) (finding no state action by private fraternal organization with liquor
permit, stating, "[h]owever detailed this type of regulation may be in some particulars, it cannot be
said to in any way foster or encourage racial discrimination," and further asserting, "[n]or can it be
said to make the State in any realistic sense a partner or even a joint venturer in the club's
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in a joint enterprise is state action.62 Finally, the participation of state
institutions as members in a private organization does not, by itself,
make the private organization a state actor,63 but governance of a private
organization by public officials acting in their official capacity does
make it a state actor. 64 These specific rule-oriented tests for state action
are in the disjunctive. If conduct qualifies as state action under any one
of the foregoing tests, then the conduct is subject to review under the
Constitution.65
There are two general approaches to applying these various tests.
The conservative wing of the Supreme Court, most recently led by the
late Chief Justice Rehnquist, favors a "rule-oriented" approach to state
action analysis, separately invoking and applying the various specific
tests described in the previous paragraph for determining whether or not
the challenged party is a state actor. In contrast, the liberal wing of the
Court employs a "totality of the circumstances" test for making this
determination. The seminal case utilizing the "totality of the
enterprise"); Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840 (finding no state action when private school terminated
employment of teachers despite fact that over ninety percent of school's funding came from
government sources, and stating, "we conclude that the school's receipt of public funds does not
make the discharge decisions acts of the State").
62. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (upholding
injunction prohibiting racial discrimination by privately-owned restaurant leasing space in publiclyowned parking deck, and stating, "[t]he State has so far insinuated itself into a position of
interdependence with Eagle that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged
activity, which, on that account, cannot be considered to have been so 'purely private' as to fall
without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment").
63. See, e.g., NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 193 (1988) (finding that the National
Collegiate Athletic Association is not a state actor, and stating, "UNLV is among the NCAA's
members and participated in promulgating the Association's rules; it must be assumed, therefore,
that Nevada had some impact on the NCAA's policy determinations," but pointing out that, "the
NCAA's several hundred other public and private member institutions each similarly affected those
policies").
64. See, e.g., Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 299300 (2001). The Court found the nominally private statewide secondary school athletic association
to be a state actor, in part because of the following facts:
In sum, to the extent of 84% of its membership, the Association is an organization of
public schools represented by their officials acting in their official capacity to provide an
integral element of secondary public schooling. There would be no recognizable
Association, legal or tangible, without the public school officials, who do not merely
control but overwhelmingly perform all but the purely ministerial acts by which the
Association exists and functions in practical terms. Only the 16% minority of private
school memberships prevents this entwinement of the Association and the public school
system from being total and their identities totally indistinguishable.
Id.at 299-300.
65. See id. at 302 (explaining that a finding of state action under the "entwinement" theory
was "in no sense unsettled merely because other criteria of state action may not be satisfied by the
same facts").
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circumstances" test is Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,66 where

the Court observed that "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing
circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private
conduct be attributed its true significance., 67 The Supreme Court has
vacillated between the rule-oriented approach and the totality of the
circumstances approach in numerous cases.
69
68
For example, in Blum v. Yaretsky and Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,

companion cases decided in 1988, the majority of the Court applied the
various tests for state action separately, finding that there was no state
action under any particular formula. The majority found that the private
school and the private nursing home in those cases were not engaged in
state action because neither the school nor the nursing home was
performing a public function, 70 neither was engaged in a joint enterprise
with the government, 7' and neither had been coerced, encouraged, or
influenced by the government to take the specific action that was being
challenged.72 In contrast, the dissent in both cases took into account all
of the facts and circumstances, concluding that even if no particular test
for state action had been wholly satisfied, the totality of government
involvement in each case warranted a finding of state action.73 In
Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Association,74 the positions of the majority and dissent were reversed,
with the majority taking all of the circumstances into account in
concluding that there was state action, 75 and the dissenters
contending
76
that no single test warranted a finding of state action.
66. Burton, 365 U.S. at 725 (finding state action and holding municipal parking authority
responsible for racially discriminatory practices of private restaurant leasing space on its property).
67. Id. at 722.
68. 457 U.S. 991, 1012 (1982) (finding no state action in conduct of nursing home which had
allegedly transferred resident to lower level of medical care without adequate notice).
69. 457 U.S. 830, 843 (1982) (finding no state action in conduct of private school which had
allegedly discharged teachers in violation of their constitutional rights).
70.
71.
72.
73.

See
See
See
See

Blum,
Blum,
Blum,
Blum,

457 U.S. at 1010-11; Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842.
457 U.S. at 1010-12; Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842-43.
457 U.S. at 1005-10; Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840-42.
457 U.S. at 1013-14 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Court today departs from

the Burton precept, ignoring the nature of the regulatory framework presented by this case in favor
of the recitation of abstract tests and a pigeonhole approach to the question of state action.");
Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 851-52 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Even though there are myriad indicia
of state action in this case, the majority refuses to find that the school acted under color of state law
when it discharged petitioners. The decision in this case marks a return to empty formalism in state
action doctrine. Because I believe that the state action requirement must be given a more sensitive
and flexible interpretation than the majority offers, I dissent.").
74. 531 U.S. 288, 291 (2001) (finding that action of statewide secondary school athletic
association constituted state action).
75.

See id. at 296.
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In my opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist's misunderstanding of the
purpose of the state action doctrine led him to adopt an inappropriately
narrow method of interpretation, namely the "rule-oriented" approach.
Chief Justice Rehnquist believed that in narrowly construing the state
action doctrine he was protecting individual liberty. 77 However, where
an individual or a private organization is not engaged in constitutionally
protected activity such as expression or the practice of religion, then
there is no reason under the Constitution to presume that the individual
or organization has a right to be free of governmental control. The
Court's reasoning in Blum and Rendell-Baker was skewed towards
protecting "individual freedom," yet a private nursing home does not
have a constitutional right to change the level of medical care rendered
to a patient without consulting the patient or the family, nor does a
private school have a constitutional right to terminate the employment of
teachers because of their criticism of the school's administration. The
task of the courts in state action cases is not to protect the individuals
and private organizations who commit these acts from government
regulation, and there is therefore no reason to narrowly construe the state
action requirement. Rather, the Court simply has the duty to ascertain
the extent of government involvement in the challenged acts in order to
determine whether or not the acts are subject to constitutional scrutiny.
Because the nature of government involvement in any particular case
may arise in myriad forms resulting from different combinations of
What is fairly attributable is a matter of normative judgment, and the criteria lack rigid
simplicity. From the range of circumstances that could point toward the State behind an
individual face, no one fact can function as a necessary condition across the board for
finding state action; nor is any set of circumstances absolutely sufficient, for there may be
some countervailing reason against attributing activity to the government.
Id. The Court concluded that, "[a]midst such variety [of fact patterns], examples may be the best
teachers...." Id. As Justice Thomas observes in dissent, however, in applying the "fairly
attributable" standard to the facts of the case, the majority of the Court in Brentwood Academy
creates a new categorical rule of "entwinement." See id. at 312; see also Wilson Huhn, The Stages
of Legal Reasoning: Formalism, Analogy, and Realism, 48 VILL. L. REV. 305, 378 (2003)

(describing how standards become rules through judicial application of a standard to specific facts).
76.

See Brentwood,531 U.S. at 305 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

We have never found state action based upon mere "entwinement." Until today, we have
found a private organization's acts to constitute state action only when the organization
performed a public function; was created, coerced, or encouraged by the government; or

acted in a symbiotic relationship with the government. The majority's holding-that the
Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association's (TSSAA) enforcement of its
recruiting rule is state action-not only extends state-action doctrine beyond its
permissible limits but also encroaches upon the realm of individual freedom that the

doctrine was meant to protect.
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
77.

See infra notes 164, 169 and accompanying text.
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factors,78 the "totality of the circumstances" test is more appropriate than
the "rule-oriented approach" for measuring whether private parties are
engaged in state action.79
C. Critique of ProgressiveScholarshipRegarding the "State
Action/Private Action " Dichotomy
A number of progressive legal scholars contend that even the
"totality of the circumstances" test is inadequate to capture the meaning80
of the state action doctrine, because "state action is always present.,
Cass Sunstein has made the following argument for the proposition that
state action is present when a private employer acts in a discriminatory
manner:
Suppose, for example, that an employer refuses to hire women, or
discharges people who disclose that they are homosexual. If the
employer's acts are challenged on constitutional grounds, we might
ask whether constitutional norms apply to the employer's action. But
we might also ask whether the constitution permits the existing
background law, undoubtedly a product of the state, to authorize the
relevant decisions by the employer. If an employer is discharging
people, or refusing to hire them, and is being allowed to do so, it is not
because nature has decreed anything. It 81is because the law has
allocated the relevant rights to the employer.
The primary argument from this point of view is that background
principles of law permeate our society, and therefore private action is
taken with the implicit sanction of law and constitutes state action.82

78. See Black, supra note 1, at 90 (stating that in light of "the variety of all possible action by
that complex entity that is called the state... [,] [t]he commitment of the Court to a single and
exclusive theory of state action, or to just five such theories, with nicely marked limits for each,
would be altogether unprincipled").
79. See id.; see also Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557, 621-22 (1992) (concluding that rules are preferable to standards in situations where the
same behavior is frequently repeated, but in situations where "behavior varies greatly," standards
are more efficient than rules).
80. See supranote 13 and accompanying text.
81. Sunstein, supra note 13, at 467.
82. See Mark Tushnet, State Action, Social Welfare Rights, and the Judicial Role: Some
Comparative Observations, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 435, 435 (2002) (concluding-after describing
situations involving discriminatory termination of a homosexual by a private employer, refusal of a
hospital to treat a deaf patient unless the patient supplied an interpreter, and private employer's
refusal to hire union members--"[i]n each [case] the defendant has acted in a manner authorized by
background rules of property and contract"); Abramchayev, supra note 13, at 863 (criticizing
decision of Supreme Court in DeShaney, and stating that, "[t]hese are specific examples of the
notion that state action is everywhere, contributing to the conditions individuals find themselves,"
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This argument proves too much. The framers believed that there
was a distinction between government action and private action, as is
evident from the text of the Constitution and its earliest interpretations.
The Constitution requires us to draw a line between state action and
private action, and this line, though subject to fair dispute in difficult
cases, must be drawn. That there is a spectrum between state action and
private action is not to be disputed, and the multivariate factors that may
influence that judgment make it a particularly complex calculation. In
the end, the decision should depend upon the extent or degree of
governmental involvement in any particular event. At present, however,
it is the clear understanding of the Supreme Court that background
principles of law allowing individuals to enter into contracts 84 and
statutes subjecting business to extensive governmental regulation 85 do
not turn the acts of these private entities into state action.
A more persuasive argument for the expansion of the state action
doctrine is based upon the familiar principle that changes in our society
may necessitate changes in the application of constitutional norms. 86 If
one assumes that the power of private individuals and entities is growing
in our society, these accumulations of private power should arguably be
subject to greater constitutional scrutiny. For example, one might
reasonably contend that the state action doctrine should be expanded in
order to protect First Amendment rights because shopping malls have
replaced downtown business areas, 87 gated communities are replacing

and asserting that, "[s]tate action is pervasive and its traces can be found in the background of any
situation").
83. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
84. See supranote 55 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
86. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992) (stating that one
of the reasons that would justify overruling constitutional precedent is "whether facts have so
changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application
or justification"); Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954). The Court in Brown stated:
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the
Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We
must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place
in American life throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if
segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
87.

See Josh Mulligan, Findinga Forum in the Simulated City: Mega Malls, Gated Towns,

and the Promise of Pruneyard, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 533, 545 (2004) ("In 2001,
shopping centers accounted for over half of the nation's retail business. However, shopping malls
were a relatively new and novel phenomenon when the Supreme Court refused to recognize free
speech rights in shopping centers.") (footnote omitted).
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neighborhoods,88 and a mass media has arisen which is under the control
of a handful of corporations.8 9 Under this view, if the state action
doctrine is not extended to include these privately-owned places and
enterprises, the average person will lose access to opportunities for free
expression.9"
However, advancing technology not only concentrates power, but
also disperses it. The power of the mass media is balanced by the fact
that video production is now in the hands of the average citizen, 91 and is
92
also balanced by "the vast democratic forums of the Internet.,
Furthermore, in general, is it accurate to say that private individuals and
organizations wield more power over us than they did over our
ancestors, or that we face greater challenges than they did in controlling
the exercise of private power? Colonial America was home to a "virtual
aristocracy" that was only slowly dissolved in the cauldron of the
Revolution. 93 In the first part of the nineteenth century, the planters who
88. See Steven Siegel, The Constitution and Private Government: Toward the Recognition of
Constitutional Rights in Private Residential Communities Fifty Years After Marsh v. Alabama, 6
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 461, 461 (1998) (contending that the actions of private residential
communities should be considered state action).
89. See John H.F. Shattuck and Fritz Byers, An Egalitarian Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 377, 378 n.7 (1981) ("The growing concentration of mass
media in the hands of a small number of large corporations limits opportunities for self-expression
for all but a few."). But see Stuart Minor Benjamin, Evaluating the Federal Communications
Commission's National Television Ownership Cap: What's Bad for Broadcasting Is Good for the
Country, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 443 (2004) (supporting laws allowing the concentration of
media ownership, stating that, "the demise of broadcast television would be a salutary event," that
"[ilt would free up valuable spectrum, lead to more innovative and more variegated programming,
and limit the incentive for and scope of government control over communications, and concluding
that "what is bad for the viability of broadcasting is good for the country").
90. See Mulligan, supra note 87, at 546 ("[I]n the world of shopping malls, common interest
communities, and corporate industrial parks, citizens are left with nowhere to engage others freely
in social and political discourse.").
91. See Steven Siegel, Lights, Video Camera... Wait!, 18 HuM. RTS. 16, 17 (1991) ("While
there is a growing concentration of corporate mass media in fewer and fewer hands-Time-Warner,
General Electric, Sony-we are also witnessing a true democratization of the media.").
92. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997) (invaliding federal law prohibiting transmission
of "indecent" expression over the internet). But see Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public
Forum in Cyberspace, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1115, 1116 (2005).
In contrast to real space (which enjoys a mixture of privately- and publicly-owned places
in which speech occurs) and in contrast to media channels such as broadcast and cable
television (which enjoy publicly-subsidized and public forums), speech in cyberspace
occurs almost exclusively within privately-owned places. The public/private balance that
characterizes real space and renders the First Amendment meaningful within it is all but
absent in cyberspace.
Id.
93. See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 7-8
(1992) ("The Revolution not only radically changed the personal and social relationships of people,
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constituted the "Slave Power" dominated southern society and
subjugated half the population. 94 In the latter half of the nineteenth
century, the Robber Barons sought to gain a stranglehold on the
economic life of the nation. 95 Sometimes the Supreme Court, in its
interpretation of the Constitution, stood in the way of the people in their
attempt to bring powerful private interests to heel, 96 but eventually the
people, acting through the democratic process, found the means to rein
in these oppressive accumulations of private power by expanding the
franchise, 97 outlawing racial and gender discrimination, 98 and regulating
business and industry. 99 So long as the democratic process remains
strong, the people will have the capability to regulate powerful private
interests, and it is not necessary to ask the Supreme Court in its
interpretation of the Constitution to do all the work. It is up to the people
acting through the democratic process to control the abuses of private
power. This is where the framers put the power and the responsibility,' 0 0
and it is appropriate for the Court to preserve this area of democratic
choice through its interpretation of the state action doctrine.

including the position of women, but also destroyed aristocracy as it had been understood in the
Western world for at least two millenia.").
94. See generally KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION (1982).
95. See Allen D. Boyer, Activist Shareholders, Corporate Directors, and Institutional
Investment. Some Lessons from the Robber Barons, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 977, 978 (1993)
(comparing "waste and chicanery" by the robber barons of the Gilded Age to the abuses by the
corporate raiders of the 1980s).
96. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 455 (1857) (invalidating Missouri
Compromise on ground that it violated the constitutional rights of slaveholders); Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 64-65 (1905) (invalidating state maximum hours law on ground that it violated
Due Process Clause).
97. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX, XXVI (removing barriers to voting based upon
race, gender, and age); amend. XVII (mandating direct election of senators); and amend. XXIV
(eliminating poll tax); Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973, 1973bb-1 (2000)).
98. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV, XIX; Public Accommodations Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000a (2000); Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat.
103 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L.
No. 90-284, tit. VIII, 82 Stat. 73 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (2000)).
99.

See, e.g., WILLIAM F. FOX, JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 119-31 (4th ed.

2000) (describing three periods of growth in regulation of business and industry).
100. See U.S. CONST. amend X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.").
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THE "STATE ACTION/STATE INACTION" DICHOTOMY

The second distinction that is drawn by the state action doctrine
emphasizes the word "action."'' 1 The Supreme Court has held that state
inaction does not constitute state action.'0 2 This aspect of the state action
doctrine is understood to mean that while the Constitution forbids the
government from exceeding its assigned powers or infringing upon
individual rights, in most cases the Constitution does not require the
government to take any particular action. In accord with this view is
Judge Richard Posner, who has described
the Constitution as "a charter
10 3
of negative rather than positive liberties."
The principle of democratic choice is fundamental to understanding
the distinction between state action and state inaction. The principle of
democratic choice means that the people, acting through their elected
and appointed representatives, have discretion to legislate with respect to
civil rights and social welfare benefits, and to determine how far they
wish to go above the constitutional baseline in each area.
The notion that the state does not have affirmative duties with
respect to civil rights or social welfare rights is consistent with the
notion of the "neutral state."' 1 4 While the idea of the neutral state is no

101. See West, Response, supra note 42, at 824 (noting that the state action doctrine
encompasses two different concepts).
In the second interpretation, the emphasis is on the action-the Constitution forbids
particular actions, not inaction. This second interpretation is typically understood as
buttressed by the common perception, or observation, that the Constitution is one of
"negative rights" only-it protects us against the bad things states do, not against the
state's failure to act.
Id
102. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 53 (1999) (finding law allowing
private insurers to withhold payments pending review of claims to be "state inaction" and therefore
immune from constitutional review); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164-65 (1978)
(stating that the Court had "clearly rejected the notion that our prior cases permitted the imposition
of Fourteenth Amendment restraints on private action by the simple device of characterizing the
State's inaction as 'authorization' or 'encouragement').
103. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding no violation under
the Constitution where police negligently failed to assist victims of automobile accident).
104. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 19
(1992). Horwitz describes the concept of the "neutral state" in the following passage:
The "night watchman" state that was first outlined for Americans in Madison's Tenth
Federalistembodied what would become a pervasive nineteenth-century liberal vision of
a neutral state, a state that could avoid taking sides in conflicts between religions, social
classes, or interest groups.
Id. One problem with the concept of the "neutral state" is that the involvement of the state may not
become apparent unless the facts of the case are sufficiently investigated. See Wendy R. Brown, The
Convergence of Neutrality and Choice: The Limits of the State's Affirmative Duty to Provide Equal
EducationalOpportunity, 60 TENN. L. REV. 63, 69 (1992) (arguing that the state's history of official
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10 5
longer considered constitutionally required,
a consequence of the
Court's current interpretation of the state action doctrine is that the
neutral state represents the default position of American government in
the absence of affirmative legislation.

A.

The Principleof Democratic Choice with Regard to Civil Rights and
Social Welfare Rights
With regard to civil rights, the principle of democratic choice under

the state action doctrine means that the people have discretion to
legislate precisely how fair, how tolerant, and how equal private citizens

must be in their interactions with others. Under this theory, the
Constitution establishes a baseline below which the government may not
go in the protection of individual rights, but above which the
government in its discretion is free to go. The constitutional baseline in
cases of private action is contained in the Thirteenth Amendment (no

person may enslave another), while the baseline in cases of state action
10 6
is contained in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.
Most civil rights laws are in addition to the constitutional baseline, and
are not mandated by the Constitution itself.10 7 The effect of the state
action doctrine upon the power of government to repeal civil rights laws,
or to make it more difficult to adopt civil rights laws and policies, is the
subject of Part V of this Article. The effect of the state action doctrine

segregation accounted for the lack of racial integration under current standards allowing students
freedom to choose which state university to attend). Brown states: "This narrow decontextualized
perspective that equality can be achieved when the state is neutral enables the court to ignore the
continuous acts of discrimination either committed or condoned by the state." Id.
105. For example, the doctrine of economic substantive due process, exemplified by cases such
as Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down maximum hour legislation) and Adkins
v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking down child labor legislation), prevented the
legislative branch of the state and federal governments from ameliorating working conditions. These
cases were eventually overruled by the Supreme Court during the mid-1930s. See, e.g., W. Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (upholding state minimum wage law and stating that
"[tihe Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract").
106. See U.S. CONST. amends. I-X, XIV; see also supranotes 93-100 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. II, § 201, 78 Stat. 243
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000e-17 (West 2003 & Supp. 2005)) (outlawing discrimination
and segregation in places of public accommodation); Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973, 1973bb-l (2000)) (eliminating various
devices employed in a discriminatory manner as barriers to voting, including literacy tests); Fair
Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII, 82 Stat. 81 (codified in scattered sections at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-31 (2000)) (outlawing discrimination in sale or lease of real estate), Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified in scattered sections at 5
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000)) (amending Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 to give
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission authority to initiate civil lawsuits against employers or
unions).
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upon the power of the federal government to adopt civil rights laws
affecting private action is the subject of Part VI of this Article.
With regard to social welfare rights, the consequence of the
distinction between "state action" and "state inaction" is that there is no
constitutional right to governmental benefits. The meaning of this is that
the people, acting through the democratic process, have unfettered
discretion to determine how generous they choose to be in the
distribution of public funds.10 8 The Supreme Court has referred to this as
the idea that the government has "no affirmative duty" to provide
benefits.10 9 This feature of the state action doctrine is the central focus of
the next portion of this Article. The following section describes how,
although legal scholars disagree about whether governmental benefits
are constitutionally required, the Supreme Court has unequivocally held
that they are not. The "no affirmative duty" doctrine is supported by the
text of the Constitution, but there are textual and historical arguments
that could support the conclusion that the government has at least some
affirmative duties. I conclude that there are strong arguments for finding
that the government has an affirmative duty to provide two
governmental services: education and protection.
B. Textual and HistoricalArguments RegardingAffirmative Duties
The distinction between state action and state inaction is supported
by the plain language of the Constitution. The Constitution says what the
government may do and what it may not do, but for the most part it does
not say what the government must do. Articles I, II, and III grant powers
to the branches of the federal government, while Article I, Sections 9
and 10, impose certain limitations on the state and federal governments.
The only affirmative duty that the original Constitution places upon the
government is set forth in the Guarantee Clause, which provides that the
government of the United States "shall guarantee to every state a
Republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against
invasion; and.. . against domestic violence."' 110 However, the Supreme
108. If the government does create a benefits program, however, the program must be
administered in a manner consistent with the requirements of Due Process, and eligibility criteria
must conform to Equal Protection. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-71 (1970)
(striking down procedures for notice and hearing regarding termination of statutory welfare
entitlements as violation of Due Process); U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)
(striking down provision of Food Stamp Act intended to exclude "hippies" and "hippy communes"
from eligibility as violation of Equal Protection).
109. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 201 (1991) ("The Government has no affirmative duty
to 'commit any resources to facilitating abortions."') (citation omitted).
110. U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 4.
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Court has ruled that cases arising under the Guarantee Clause are
nonjusticiable political questions."'
Most of the Amendments to the Constitution are also phrased as
limitations on the power of government. The First Amendment states
that "Congress shall make no law" abridging freedom of speech, press,
religion, or the right to petition for redress of grievances; 1 2 the Second
Amendment states that the right of the people to keep and bear arms
"shall not be infringed;"' '13 and the remainder of the first eight
amendments within the Bill of Rights are similarly prohibitory in
nature.11 4 The Ninth Amendment might be construed as allowing for the
possibility of affirmative rights, stating that "[t]he enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people. '1 5 However, the unenumerated
rights that have been recognized to date, including freedom of
association,'16 the right to travel,' 17 and the right to privacy, 1 8 are, like
11.See,

e.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 3 (1849).
The question which of the two opposing governments was the legitimate one, viz. the
charter government, or the government established by the voluntary convention, has not
heretofore been regarded as a judicial one in any of the State courts. The political
department has always determined whether a proposed constitution or amendment was
ratified or not by the people of the State, and the judicial power has followed its decision.

Id.
112. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
113. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
114. See U.S. CONST. amend. III ("No soldier shall... be quartered in any house ....); U.S.
CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ....
");U.S. CONST.
amend. V ("No person shall be held.., nor shall any person be subject for the same offense ...nor
shall be compelled.., nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property... nor shall private property be
taken ....); U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
[specified rights]."); U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In suits at common law... the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved ....); U.S. CONST. amend. ViII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed ....
").
115. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
116. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 661 (2000) (ruling that the state may
not apply anti-discrimination law against organization with a significant message against
homosexuality); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) ("It is beyond
debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an
inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which embraces freedom of speech."); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 443-45 (1963) (striking
down state law infringing freedom of association).
117. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500-04 (1999) (discussing the textual basis for
different aspects of the right to travel).
118. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (striking down state law making
homosexual conduct a crime, and stating that "liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct"); Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 505-06 (1977) (striking down state law restricting grandmother from living with her
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the enumerated rights, doctrines that prohibit the government from
restraining individual action.
Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment appears to be phrased in
negative terms, but there are persuasive arguments that at least one
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes an affirmative duty
upon the states. The first three words of the second sentence of the
Fourteenth Amendment are: "No state shall."'1 9 This sentence declares
that the states may not "abridge" the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States, "deprive" persons of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor "deny" to any person the equal
protection of the laws. 120 The first two clauses of this sentence clearly
impose prohibitions-not obligations-upon the state governments, in
that no state is permitted to "abridge" or "deprive" the fundamental
rights of individuals. The third clause of this sentence-the Equal
Protection Clause-is more difficult to classify as imposing solely a
negative prohibition upon the state governments.
There are three textual arguments which support a finding that the
Equal Protection Clause imposes an affirmative duty upon the
government. First, there is a "plain meaning" argument. The double
negative "to not deny" may be literally construed to mean "to
provide."' 2 1 Second, there is an intratextual argument based upon a
comparison of the phraseology of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Privileges and Immunities Clause ("No state shall make or enforce any
grandchildren); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-66 (1973) (striking down state law forbidding
abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, (1965) (striking down state law forbidding use of
contraceptive devices).

119. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The principal drafter of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Representative John Bingham, stated that he was inspired to use the words "No state shall" by Chief
Justice John Marshall's opinion in Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 248-49 (1833), wherein the
Court declined to apply the Bill of Rights against the states in part because the Bill of Rights lacked
the language used in Article I, Section 9 and Section 10: "No state shall .. " Bingham stated:
Acting upon this suggestion I did imitate the framers of the original Constitution. As they
had said, 'no state shall emit bills of credit, pass any bill of attainder, ex postfacto law, or
law impairing the obligations of contracts;' imitating their example and imitating it to the
letter, I prepared the provision of the first section of the fourteenth amendment as it
stands in the Constitution ......
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 84 (1871), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION
AMENDMENTS' DEBATES: THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY DEBATES tN
CONGRESS ON THE 13TH, 14TH, AND 15TH AMENDMENTS 510 (Alfred Avins ed., 1967) [hereinafter

Avins].
120. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
121. See West, Response, supra note 42, at 825 ("The Fourteenth Amendment, read literally,
comes much closer to prohibiting inaction than action. 'No State Shall... Deny ...Equal
Protection' means, if we take out the double negative, that all states must provide something,
namely equal protection of law.") (footnote omitted).
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law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States . . . .") and the Equal Protection Clause ("[N]or shall any
state ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."). This argument was made by Senator John Pool on the floor
of Congress shortly after the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted:
There the word "deny" is used again; it is used in contradistinction to
the first clause, which says, "No state shall make or enforce any law"
which shall do so and so. That would be a positive act which would
contravene the right of a citizen; but to say that it shall not deny to any
person the equal protection of the law it seems to me opens up a
different branch of the subject. It shall not deny by acts of omission, by
a failure to prevent its own citizens
122 from depriving by force any of
their fellow-citizens of these rights.
A third textual argument supporting an affirmative understanding of
the Equal Protection Clause is to consider the way the Clause reads if the
adjective "equal" is omitted: "No state shall ... deny to any person...
the... protection of the laws." This clearly imposes an affirmative duty
of protection upon the government. If the Clause is read in this way, the
word "equal" does not limit, but rather enhances, the obligation of the
government toward the citizenry; not only must the government protect
its citizens, but also it must do so equally. This reading of the Equal
Protection Clause, although unfamiliar to contemporary Americans, was
the standard understanding of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment,
who were concerned with the lack of protection accorded to Unionists
and newly-freed slaves in the Reconstruction South. 123 As many
constitutional scholars have noted, the members of the Reconstruction
Congress who adopted the Fourteenth Amendment were committed to a
particular theory of the social contract. 124 The framers of the amendment
122. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3611 (1870), reprinted in Avins, supra note 119, at
447.
123. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 697 (1871), reprinted in Avins, supra note
119, at 563 (remarks of Senator Edmunds, citing the Magna Carta for the proposition that "it has
been the recognized and bounden duty of all courts, and of all executive officers intrusted with the
administration of justice and the law, to give that which the citizen was entitled to, to execute justice
and afford protection against all forms of wrong and oppression," and referring to this as an
"affirmative right in the citizen," not "a mere negative declaration, a kind of admonitory prohibition
to a State").
124. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 302, 303-05 (1990) (stating that "[n]atural law and law-of-nations thinkers had
stressed the idea that citizens owe allegiance to their government in exchange for the government's
grant of protection to them," and citing and quoting remarks of members of Congress who agreed
with this principle); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Congressional Enforcement of Civil Rights and John
Bingham's Theory of Citizenship, 36 AKRON L. REV. 717, 740 (2003) ("This theory of citizenship
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believed that a citizen owes a duty of allegiance to government in return
for the protection offered by the government. 125 Here is what Senator
Lyman Trumbull, the author of the Civil Rights Act of 1866126 and a
floor manager of the Fourteenth Amendment, 127 said about allegiance
and protection:
How is it that every person born in these United States owes allegiance
to the Government? ... [C]an it be that our ancestors struggled
through a long war and set up this Government, and that the people of
our day have struggled through another war, with all its sacrifices and
all its desolation, to maintain it, and at last that we have got a
Government which is all-powerful to command the obedience of the
citizen, but has no power to afford him protection?

Sir, it cannot be. Such is not the meaning of our Constitution. Such is
not the meaning of American citizenship. This Government... has
certainly some power to protect its own citizens28 in their own country.
Allegiance and protection are reciprocal rights. 1

Many other members of Congress expressed this view, 129 and it is
reasonable to conclude that the framers had this theory in mind when
they adopted the Equal Protection Clause.
reflected the 'social compact' theory of John Locke, that people submit to the authority of the
government in return for its protection."); Madry, supra note 4, at 40 (referring to the "familiar
Republican linkage between allegiance and protection").
125. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 124, at 302 (stating that this view "figured
prominently in the [congressional] debates").
126. See FRANK J. SCATURRO, THE SUPREME COURT'S RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION: A
DISTORTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 27 (2000).
127. See Hadely Arkes, Book Review: Scalia Contra Mundum, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
231,241 (1997).
128. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1757 (1866). This is an early statement of
Trumbull, before he shifted to opposition to Reconstruction. See SCATURRO, supra note 126, at 29
(noting that Trumbull was nominated for Governor by the Democrats in 1880); see also infra notes
281, 285 (citing instances where Trumbull voted against Reconstruction, opposing important civil
rights legislation in 1871 and 1875).
129. See, for example, the remarks of Representative John H. Broomal:
But throwing aside the letter of the Constitution, there are characteristics of
Governments that belong to them as such, without which they would cease to be
Governments. The rights and duties of allegiance and protection are corresponding rights
and duties. Upon whatever square foot of the earth's surface I owe allegiance to my
country, there it owes me protection, and wherever my Government owes me no
protection I owe it no allegiance and can commit no treason.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1263 (1866), reprinted in Avins, supra note 119, at 175. John
Bingham quoted Daniel Webster as having said:
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C. JudicialInterpretationand Scholarly Commentary upon Social
Welfare Rights
Despite the force of these textual and historical arguments, the
Supreme Court, for the most part, has found that individuals do not have
a constitutional right to governmental benefits, and it has invoked this
aspect of the state action doctrine in a number of cases, finding no
affirmative duty on the part of the government to provide welfare
benefits,13 ° housing, 131 or medical care. 32 In an abortion-funding case,
the Court expressly distinguished between negative liberties and

affirmative duties:
Although the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause affords
protection against unwarranted government interference with freedom
of choice in the context of certain personal decisions, it does not confer
The maintenance of this Constitution does not depend on the plighted faith of the States
as States to support it.... It relies on individual duty and obligation.

On the other hand, the Government owes high and solemn duties to every citizen of
the country. It is bound to protect him in his most important rights and interests.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1871), reprintedin Avins, supra note 119, at 511.
130. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970) (upholding state regulation
imposing a cap of $275 per month upon AFDC payments regardless of family size and actual need,
and stating, "here we deal with state regulation in the social and economic field, not affecting
freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights").
131. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (upholding Oregon Forcible Entry and
Detainer Act).
We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. But the
Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill. We are
unable to perceive in that document any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of
a particular quality, or any recognition of the right of a tenant to occupy the real property
of his landlord beyond the term of his lease without the payment of rent or otherwise
contrary to the terms of the relevant agreement. Absent constitutional mandate, the
assurance of adequate housing and the definition of landlord-tenant relationships are
legislative, not judicial, functions.
Id.
132. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977) (upholding state Medicaid regulation that
denied payment for abortions that were not "medically necessary," stating, "Roe did not declare an
unqualified 'constitutional right to an abortion,"' and that, "[r]ather, the right protects the woman
only from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her
pregnancy"); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (upholding the "Hyde Amendment,"
federal legislation which prohibited the use of Medicaid funds to pay for abortions except to save
the life of the mother or in cases of rape or incest, and stating, "although government may not place
obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not
of its own creation"); see also Kenneth R. Wing, The Right to Health Care in the United States, 2
ANNALS HEALTH L. 161, 161 (1993) ("There is nothing that can be characterized-at least in any
general sense-as a constitutional right to health care in the United States.").
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an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize all the
advantages of that freedom. To hold otherwise would mark a drastic
change in our understanding of the Constitution. It cannot be that
because government may not prohibit the use of contraceptives, or
prevent parents from sending their child to a private school,
government, therefore, has an affirmative constitutional obligation to
ensure that all persons have the financial resources to obtain
contraceptives or send their children to private schools. To translate the
limitation on governmental power implicit in the Due Process Clause
into an affirmative funding obligation would require Congress to
subsidize the medically necessary abortion of an indigent woman even
if Congress had not enacted 13a3 Medicaid program to subsidize other
medically necessary services.
These decisions of the Supreme Court establish that there is no
fundamental constitutional right to subsistence payments, shelter, or
134
medical care.
A number of legal scholars agree with the Court that social welfare
rights are not embodied in the Constitution. David Currie, for example,
characterizes arguments in favor of social welfare rights as "taking
liberties with the Constitution. ' , 135 On the other hand, there are legal

133. Harris,448 U.S. at 317-18 (citations omitted).
134. The Justices of the Supreme Court have not been unanimous in their acceptance of the "no
affirmative duty" doctrine. See Dandridge,397 U.S. at 520-21 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (declining
to find a fundamental right to subsistence payments, but nevertheless concluding that the cap on
subsistence payments was discriminatory towards large families).
In my view, equal protection analysis of this case is not appreciably advanced by the a priori
definition of a "right," fundamental or otherwise. Rather, concentration must be placed upon
the character of the classification in question, the relative importance to individuals in the
class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the
asserted state interests in support of the classification.
Id.(footnote omitted). See also Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 89-90 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
But where the right is so fundamental as the tenant's claim to his home, the requirements
of due process should be more embracing. In the setting of modem urban life, the home,
even though it be in the slums, is where man's roots are. To put him into the street when
the slum landlord, not the slum tenant, is the real culprit deprives the tenant of a
fundamental right without any real opportunity to defend.
Id. See also Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 588 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (dissenting where the majority of the Supreme Court denied the procedural due process
claim of an untenured faculty member who had not been rehired by a state university on the ground
that the professor had no "property right" in continued employment, Marshall, J., stated that, "[i]n
[his] view, every citizen who applies for a government job is entitled to it unless the government
can establish some reason for denying the employment").
135.

See David P. Currie, Positive and Negative ConstitutionalRights, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 864

(1986) ("[T]hink twice about considering a set of positive constitutional rights as either a necessary
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scholars who have written in favor of the constitutionalization of social
welfare rights. Charles L. Black, for example, in his book A New Birth of
Freedom, argued that the inalienable right to "the pursuit of happiness"
set forth in the Declaration of Independence means that the government
has the affirmative duty to attempt to eliminate poverty. 136 Other leading
scholars who have called for recognition of social welfare rights include
Frank Michelman1 37 and Peter Edelman.' 3 8 However, even scholars who
are sympathetic to finding social welfare rights to be mandated by the
Constitution have concluded that this view is not likely to prevail 39 or
that, for 0 practical reasons, such rights would be unenforceable by the
4
courts. 1

or a sufficient condition for the achievement of the social state, and more than twice about the
advisability of taking liberties with the Constitution to find them.").
136. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND
UNNAMED 131-39 (1997).
137. See generally Frank I. Michelman, Forward: On Protecting the Poor Through the
FourteenthAmendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1969).
138. See generally Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our
Duty to the Poor,39 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1987); see also Robin West, Response, supra note 42, at 822
(discussing whether a panhandler has a constitutional right to governmental assistance).
The Constitution may be read, particularly if we read it in conjunction with the preamble
and the Declaration of Independence, as suggesting that the panhandler.., has [a]
constitutional right to some minimal level of welfare. If the legislature does not allocate
some appropriate level of funding so as to ensure him decent food, housing, and above
all medical care, he has cause for a constitutional complaint. Where and against whom
he will press that complaint is a dicey subject, but he has been constitutionally
aggrieved.
Id.
139. See William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique and
Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 1821, 1824 (2001) ("Today, welfare rights are no longer part
of anyone's 'ideal Constitution.' Today, the idea simply seems 'off the table' and 'off-the-wall."')
(footnotes omitted). Robin West explains that many progressive legal scholars have come to see the
traditional structure of constitutional rights as an obstacle to the creation of welfare programs, and
therefore it is not surprising that these scholars have not developed a jurisprudence of social welfare
rights. Robin West, Rights, Capabilities,and the Good Society, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1901, 1917
(2001) ("We might lack this jurisprudence, in part, because those who might otherwise have been
inclined to contribute to that jurisprudence have been convinced not only of the futility of the
project, but also of its counterproductivity.").
140. See Lawrence G. Sager, Thin Constitutions and the Good Society, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
1989 (2001) ("We should understand the Constitution as containing some normative premises,
albeit judicially unenforceable, that are categorical, non-negotiable, and demanding of priority. I
think, for example, that the proposition that we ought to arrange our economic affairs so that a
person willing to work hard will be able to provide herself and her family with minimum food,
shelter, education, and medical care, is such a premise."); see also West, Response, supra note 42, at
819 (2004) ("With respect to welfare rights in particular, the constitutional case for welfare rights is
strong, but it is one that must and should be directed to legislatures.").
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In my opinion, the principle of democratic choice is a powerful
argument against finding social welfare rights to be constitutionally
mandated. Social welfare programs cost money, and the courts are not
constitutionally empowered to impose taxes. A particularly memorable
' 41
cry in our history was "no taxation without representation.'
Furthermore, the Constitution clearly vests the spending power in the
legislative branch. The first power that is enumerated among the powers
of Congress is the power "to lay and collect taxes ... to pay the debts
and provide for the general welfare of the United States.' 42 To make it
crystal clear who has the power of the purse, the Constitution also
specifically provides that "[n]o Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law." 143 The
Supreme Court has recognized that the executive branch lacks
constitutional authority over spending as demonstrated by the
"impoundment" controversy 144 and the unconstitutionality of the "line
item veto."' 145 If the power of appropriation is denied to the executive
branch, how much less may it be said to reside in the judicial branch? A
judicial order requiring the government to affirmatively provide welfare
or other governmental benefits would strike most Americans as a stark
violation of the separation of powers.

141. See
No
Taxation
Without
Representation,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Taxation without-representation (last visited Aug. 25, 2006) ("'No taxation without representation'
was a rallying cry for advocates of American independence from Great Britain in the eighteenth
century.... A slightly different version, 'Taxation without representation is tyranny,' is attributed
to James Otis."); see also Virtual War Museum Revolutionary War Hall,
http://www.virtualology.com/virtualwarmuseum.com/revolutionarywarhallnotaxationwithoutrepes
entation.net/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2006) (quoting an excerpt from circular letter dated September
14, 1768, signed by John Hancock, stating "Taxes equally detrimental to the Commercial interests
of the Parent Country and her Colonies, are imposed upon the People, without their Consent")
(emphasis omitted).
142. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has generally abdicated any
responsibility for determining whether federal spending is for the "general welfare."
143. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 7; see also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) ("In
considering whether a particular expenditure is intended to serve general public purposes, courts
should defer substantially to the judgment of Congress.").
144. See Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 46-49 (1975) (ordering the Administrator of
the Environmental Protection Agency to release funds appropriated by Congress).
145. See Clinton v. City of New York, 547 U.S. 417, 451-53 (1988) (striking down federal
Line Item Veto Act that authorized President to cancel spending items).
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E. Education and Protectionas Affirmative Duties
Although the Supreme Court has, in general, rejected the notion of
affirmative rights to governmental benefits, there are two specific
government services that people arguably have a constitutional right to
receive: education and protection. The primary legal argument in favor
of finding a fundamental right to education is that education is necessary
for the exercise of other rights, while the principal legal argument in
favor of finding "protection" to be a fundamental right is that this was
clearly intended by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
addition, recognizing education and protection as affirmative
governmental duties would promote the principle of democratic choice,
and would therefore be consistent with the state action doctrine.
In Brown v. Board of Education,146 the Supreme Court found that
"education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments."' 147 However, the Court in Brown did not rule that the state
must provide every child with a public school education; rather, the
Court said, "Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms.' 4 8 In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,49
the Supreme Court considered whether education should be considered
to be a fundamental right because it is necessary for the exercise of other
50
fundamental rights, including freedom of speech and the right to vote.
The Court rejected this view, expressly ruling that education is not a
146. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
147. Id. at 493. The Court stated:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It
is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in
the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is
denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
Id.
148. Id. (emphasis added).
149. 411 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1973) (upholding variations in funding among different school districts
within state against equal protection challenge).
150. Id. at 35 ("It is appellees' contention, however, that education is distinguishable from
other services and benefits provided by the State because it bears a peculiarly close relationship to
other rights and liberties accorded protection under the Constitution. Specifically, they insist that
education is itself a fundamental personal right because it is essential to the effective exercise of
First Amendment freedoms and to intelligent utilization of the right to vote.").
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fundamental right. 151 Strictly speaking, however, this finding was obiter
dictum, because the question before the Court was not whether
schoolchildren could be utterly denied a free public education, but rather
whether differences in funding among public school districts violated the
Constitution. Elsewhere in the opinion the Court appeared to reserve
ruling on the question of whether a state is obligated to allocate
funding
52
to provide its children with a minimum adequate education.1
Similarly, in two decisions since Rodriguez, although the Court has
not declared education a fundamental right, it has also not ruled out the
possibility that the state has the obligation to provide children with a
minimum adequate education. In Plyler v. Doe,153 the Court held that it
was unconstitutional for a state to charge tuition for the children of
illegal aliens to attend the public schools, in part upon the ground that
education is vital to preparing children for a meaningful role in
society. 154 Dissenting in Plyler, Chief Justice Warren Burger contended
that the majority of the Court had, in effect, elevated education to the
level of a "quasi-fundamental right."'155 And in Kadrmas v. Dickinson

151. Id. ("Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our
Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.").
152. Id.at 36-37.
Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of education is a
constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either right, we have
no indication that the present levels of educational expenditures in Texas provide an
education that falls short. Whatever merit appellees' argument might have if a State's
financing system occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its
children, that argument provides no basis for finding an interference with fundamental
rights where only relative differences in spending levels are involved and where-as is
true in the present case-no charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide
each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the
enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in the political process.
Id.
153. 457 U.S. 202, 239-40 (1982) (striking down Texas law requiring the children of
undocumented aliens to pay tuition to attend the public schools).
154. Id. at 223-24.
But more is involved in these cases than the abstract question whether [the state statute]
discriminates against a suspect class, or whether education is a fundamental right. [The
state statute] imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable
for their disabling status. The stigma of illiteracy will mark them for the rest of their
lives. By denying these children a basic education, we deny them the ability to live
within the structure of our civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic possibility that
they will contribute in even the smallest way to the progress of our Nation. In
determining the rationality of [the state law], we may appropriately take into account its
costs to the Nation and to the innocent children who are its victims. In light of these
countervailing costs, the discrimination contained in [the law] can hardly be considered
rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the State.
155. Id.at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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Public Schools, 15 6 the Court upheld a state law charging children's
families for transportation to the public schools, even though such a law
imposed a disproportionately greater burden upon the poor,' 57 once
again stating that education is not a fundamental right. 158 However, the
Court noted that the state law in question expressly provided that a
school board could take no action against a pupil whose family was too
poor to pay the transportation fees.' 59 Accordingly, like Rodriguez but
unlike Plyler, the Court in Kadrmas was faced with evaluating the
constitutionality of a law which did not utterly deny a class of children
the opportunity of a free public education. At a minimum, whether a free
public education is a fundamental
right is at least a close and difficult
60
question.'
constitutional
Another difficult question which arises under the "no affirmative
duty" aspect of the state action doctrine is whether the government is
obligated under the Constitution to protect its citizens from acts of
private violence. The leading case on this question is Deshaney v.
Winnebago County Departmentof Social Services.16' The Deshaney case
Yet by patching together bits and pieces of what might be termed quasi-suspect-class and
quasi-fundamental-rights analysis, the Court spins out a theory custom-tailored to the
facts of these cases. In the end, we are told little more than that the level of scrutiny
employed to strike down the Texas law applies only when illegal alien children are
deprived of a public education. If ever a court was guilty of an unabashedly resultoriented approach, this case is a prime example.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
156. 487 U.S. 450, 464-65 (1988) (upholding North Dakota law allowing local school districts
to charge families for bus transportation to public schools).
157. Seeid. at458.
Appellants contend that Dickinson's user fee for bus service unconstitutionally deprives
those who cannot afford to pay it of "minimum access to education." Sarita Kadrmas,
however, continued to attend school during the time that she was denied access to the
school bus. Appellants must therefore mean to argue that the busing fee
unconstitutionally places a greater obstacle to education in the path of the poor than it
does in the path of wealthier families.
Id. (citation omitted).
158. Id.
159. See id. at 459-60 ("A [school] board may waive any fee if any pupil or his parent or
guardian shall be unable to pay such fees. No pupil's rights or privileges, including the receipt of
grades or diplomas, may be denied or abridged for nonpayment of fees.") (quoting N.D. CENT.
CODE § 15-43-11.2 (1981)).
160. See generally John Dayton & Anne Dupre, School Funding Litigation: Who's Winning the
War?, 57 VAND L. REV. 2351 (2004) (summarizing school funding cases at state and federal level);
see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalizationof Education, 36 LOY. CHI. L.J. 111, 13435 (2004) (criticizing the Supreme Court for failing to apply the Constitution to the schools in a
number of settings, stating that, "constitutional guarantees of equal protection, freedom of speech,
protection from unreasonable search and seizure, and procedural due process all have been deemed
to have little application in schools").
161. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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arose out of one of the most repulsive and tragic incidents ever reviewed
by the Supreme Court. Four-year-old Joshua DeShaney was beaten
repeatedly by his father, and even though a family member, neighbors,
and emergency room personnel made multiple reports of child abuse to
the state, and the state made nearly twenty home visits where serious
signs of abuse were observed, the state failed to remove the child from
the home before the final beating which rendered Joshua brain-damaged
and profoundly retarded. 162 Joshua and his mother claimed that the State
had violated Joshua's fundamental rights by leaving him in his father's
home despite knowledge of the abuse. 163 The Supreme Court ruled
against Joshua, and expressly held that under circumstances such as
these the government has no duty to protect
individuals from acts of
64
1
individuals.
other
by
committed
violence
The Supreme Court invoked two aspects of the state action doctrine
in the DeShaney case. First, the Court drew the distinction between state
action and private action. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice
Rehnquist pointed out that the violence had been perpetrated by Joshua's
father, not by the government.' 65 Second, the Court referred to the
distinction between state action and state inaction, and observed that the
events complained of were not that the state had committed some act
against Joshua, but that it had failed to act, 166 and that absent a "special
relationship" between Joshua and the government, the state had no duty

162. See id. at 191-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan gave this description of the
facts:
Each time someone voiced a suspicion that Joshua was being abused, that information
was relayed to the Department for investigation and possible action. When Randy
DeShaney's second wife told the police that he had "hit the boy causing marks and [was]
a prime case for child abuse," the police referred her complaint to DSS. When, on three
separate occasions, emergency room personnel noticed suspicious injuries on Joshua's
body, they went to DSS with this information. When neighbors informed the police that
they had seen or heard Joshua's father or his father's lover beating or otherwise abusing
Joshua, the police brought these reports to the attention of DSS. And when respondent
Kemmeter, through these reports and through her own observations in the course of
nearly 20 visits to the DeShaney home, compiled growing evidence that Joshua was
being abused, that information stayed within the Department--chronicled by the social
worker in detail that seems almost eerie in light of her failure to act upon it.
Id. at 208-09 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
163. See id. at 193.
164. See id. at 195 ("[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the
State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.").
165. See id. at 203 ("[T]he harm was inflicted not by the State of Wisconsin, but by Joshua's
father.").
166. See id ("The most that can be said of the state functionaries in this case is that they stood
by and did nothing when suspicious circumstances dictated a more active role for them.").
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to protect him. 167 The Court noted that if the state had deprived Joshua
of his liberty by taking him into custody, then it would have had the
affirmative duty to protect him from harm. 168 However, in a passage that
recalls Chief Justice Rehnquist's belief that the state action doctrine is
intended to protect "individual freedom," he stated: "While the State
may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua faced in the free world,
it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything to render him
any more vulnerable to them.' ' 169 The Court ruled that neither the
original custody ruling placing Joshua in his father's care nor the
decision of caseworkers to leave Joshua in70his father's home sufficiently
implicated the government in the beating.'
Aside from the harshness of this ruling, 171 the reasoning of the
majority in DeShaney is troublesome for a number of reasons. First of
all, the Court was able to reach this result only by finding that there was
no "state action," a conclusion that seems remarkable in light of the
extensive number of home visits and intervention by state authorities
into Joshua's life. Second, the application of the state action doctrine in

167. See id. at 197-202.
168. See id. at 198-99 (referring to prisoners and persons who have been involuntarily
committed mental patients, and stating that "[i]t is true that in certain limited circumstances the
Constitution imposes upon the State affirmative duties of care and protection with respect to
particular individuals").
169. Idat201.
170. The Chief Justice stated:
That the State once took temporary custody of Joshua does not alter the analysis, for
when it returned him to his father's custody, it placed him in no worse position than that
in which he would have been had it not acted at all; the State does not become the
permanent guarantor of an individual's safety by having once offered him shelter. Under
these circumstances, the State had no constitutional duty to protect Joshua.
Id.
171. See id. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated:
Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated attacks by an irresponsible, bullying, cowardly, and
intemperate father, and abandoned by respondents who placed him in a dangerous
predicament and who knew or learned what was going on, and yet did essentially
nothing except, as the Court revealingly observes, "dutifully recorded these incidents in
[their] files." It is a sad commentary upon American life, and constitutional principlesso full of late of patriotic fervor and proud proclamations about "liberty and justice for
all"-that this child, Joshua DeShaney, now is assigned to live out the remainder of his
life profoundly retarded. Joshua and his mother, as petitioners here, deserve-but now
are denied by this Court-the opportunity to have the facts of their case considered in the
light of the constitutional protection that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is meant to provide.
Id.(citation omitted); see also Thomas J. Sullivan & Richard L. Bitter, Jr., Abused Children,
Schools, and the Affirmative Duty to Protect. How the Deshaney Decision Cast Children into a
Constitutional Void, 13 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 243, 243 (2003) ("Categorically, it does not
seem fair nor just that states are able to let this behavior reach such levels, however under
DeShaney, it sure is constitutional.").
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this case was inconsistent with the Court's own description of the
purpose of the doctrine. Third, the conclusion that the state has no
affirmative duty to protect individuals from acts of private violence is
contrary to the expressed intent of the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment. And fourth, the principle of democratic choice requires the
Court to recognize a duty of protection in this case, because the right of
protection is fundamentally different from the claimed right to social
welfare benefits.
First, even if one accepts the ruling of the Court that an affirmative
duty of protection arises only where an individual has entered into a
"special relationship" with the state, it seems reasonably clear that such a
relationship existed in the DeShaney case. The state had placed Joshua in
the custody of his father; the state was notified of the abuse pursuant to a
process established by state law; the state undertook to monitor the
home, and undertook the responsibility to remove Joshua if necessary;
the state observed compelling evidence of physical abuse; and most
importantly, the state decided to leave Joshua in the custody of his
father, despite the child's obvious need for protection.' 7 2 As the
dissenting justices in DeShaney observed, this would seem to constitute
significant3 involvement by the state in the events that led up to the final
7
beating. 1'

Second, it is difficult to see how the ruling of the Court in the
DeShaney case advances the purposes of the state action doctrine even
as those purposes are understood by the Court. As noted above, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, who authored the DeShaney opinion, grounded the
state action doctrine upon a philosophy of individualism. 174 But even if
one accepts the individualistic premise of the state action doctrine
subscribed to by Chief Justice Rehnquist, it seems inappropriate to apply
that concept to children, let alone children who are being
monitored by
75
the governmental system of child protective services. 1
172. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 162 and accompanying text (summarizing actions taken by the state and
state employees regarding Joshua).
174. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
175. See generally Deborah Austern Colson, Note, Safe Enough to Learn: Placing an
Affirmative Duty of Protection on Public Schools Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, 30 HARV. C.R.-

C.L. L. REV. 169 (1995) (arguing placement of children in public schools sufficient to trigger
affirmative duty of protection); Karen W. Yiu, Foster Parents as State Actors in Section 1983
Actions: What Rayburn v. Hogue Missed, 7 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 117 (2003) (arguing
placement of children in foster care triggers affirmative duty of protection); Sullivan & Bitter, supra
note 171, at 243 ("DeShaney is bad law because it says that states do not have an affirmative duty
under the United States Constitution to protect the most powerless members of our society-abused
children.").
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Third, the Supreme Court in DeShaney badly misread the intent of
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the years immediately
following the Civil War, terrorists threatened the newly freed blacks,
while Southern courts, legislatures, and law enforcement officials denied
blacks and their political allies the protection of the laws., 76 The
Republicans in Congress were determined to end this reign of terror, and
with that thought in mind they adopted a constitutional amendment that
would guarantee to every person the protection of the laws. 7 7 However,
the Supreme Court in DeShaney could find no affirmative duty of
protection in the Fourteenth Amendment. Writing for the Court, the
Chief Justice asserted that the Due Process Clause:
[F]orbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or
property without 'due process of law,' but its language cannot fairly be
extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that
those interests do not come to harm through other means. 178
Reviewing the historical evidence on this point, which is described
both above17 9 and in Part VI of this Article, Professor Steven Heyman
concludes that "the congressional debates show that imposing a
constitutional duty on the states to protect the fundamental rights of their
citizens was a principal object of that Amendment." 180 Heyman says:
A central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment and Reconstruction
legislation was to establish the right to protection as a part of the
federal Constitution and laws, and thus to require the states to protect
the fundamental rights of all persons, black as well as white. In
establishing a federal right to protection, the Fourteenth Amendment
was not creating a new right, but rather incorporating into the
Constitution the concept of protection as understood in the classical
tradition. The debates in the Thirty-Ninth Congress over the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 confirm that
the constitutional right to protection was understood to include
protection against private violence. 181

176. See infra notes 189-92, 234-35, 261-71 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 121-29 and accompanying text; infra notes 261-66 and accompanying
text.
178. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).
179. See supra notes 110-30 and accompanying text; infra notes 234-85 and accompanying
text.
180. Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection,Liberty and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507, 571 (1991) (footnote omitted).
181. Id. at 546 (footnote omitted).
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I agree with the conclusion of Professor Heyman and other scholars
that the historical evidence is compelling that the Equal Protection
Clause was intended to impose upon the government a duty of protection
against acts of private violence-a duty that the State of Wisconsin may
have violated in the DeShaney case, if the actions of the state were
undertaken with the requisite state of mind and level of culpability. 82
Finally, in my opinion, the Court's application of the state action
doctrine in DeShaney is wrong because it is inconsistent with the
principle of democratic choice. The Chief Justice argued that it is up to
the people of Wisconsin to decide whether or not the state should be
held liable for its failure to enforce the laws.183 But "protection" is
fundamentally different from other governmental benefits like
subsistence payments, housing, or medical care, in that it does not
necessarily entail the spending of additional funds. A judicial finding
that the state has an affirmative duty to protect its citizens does not
intrude upon the reserved power of the legislature to impose taxes and
control spending. Furthermore, where the Court is merely enjoining the
executive branch to enforce protective laws which have already been
enacted, this would serve to promote the principle of democratic choice.
In DeShaney, the people of Wisconsin had already spoken when the
child protection laws were enacted, and the Court interfered with the will
184
of the people when it failed to require the enforcement of those laws.
F. Conclusion
The principle of democratic choice generally supports the concept
of the "no affirmative duty" doctrine, and the critics of the Supreme
Court on the left of the political spectrum have erred in concluding that
there is an affirmative constitutional right to welfare benefits. However,

182. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332-33 (1986) (referring to the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and stating, "we do not believe its protections are triggered
by lack of due care by prison officials").
183. See id. at 203. The Chief Justice stated:
The people of Wisconsin may well prefer a system of liability which would place upon

the State and its officials the responsibility for failure to act in situations such as the
present one. They may create such a system, if they do not have it already, by changing
the tort law of the State in accordance with the regular lawmaking process. But they
should not have it thrust upon them by this Court's expansion of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id.
184. Also see text accompanying notes 336-41 infra, arguing that the Supreme Court similarly
contravened the principle of democratic choice when it invalidated the Violence Against Women
Act in United States v. Morrison,529 U.S. 598 (2000).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol34/iss4/5

38

Huhn: The State Action Doctrine and the Principle of Democratic Choice
2006]

THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE

there is a persuasive argument in favor of the affirmative right to an
education, necessary as it is for effective participation in our democracy.
Although the Supreme Court has stated in dictum that there is no
fundamental right to education, the Court has yet to rule on the question
of whether there is a fundamental right to a minimum adequate public
education. Furthermore, the principle of democratic choice indicates that
the Supreme Court erred in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department
of Social Services when it found that the executive branch of a state
government has no affirmative duty under the Constitution to enforce
existing laws protecting its citizens.
The following portion of this Article discusses the distinction
between "mere repeal" of a law and "distortion of the governmental
process."
V.

THE "MERE REPEAL/DISTORTION OF GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS"
DICHOTOMY

A third type of state action problem arises when there is a
legislative reaction against a civil rights movement. As a civil rights
movement gathers momentum and begins to achieve legislative
victories, it is common for there to be a backlash, a counter-reaction, as
the traditional majority resists the emerging claim for equality. When
this occurs, a central question that arises is whether the "backlash"
amounts to unconstitutional "state action."
A. Legal Restrictions Placedon Civil Rights Movements in American
History
A significant example of a backlash against civil rights occurred in
the 1830s. As the antislavery movement gained ground in America, there
was a terrible reaction against it.' 85 And just as slavery is the denial of
the fundamental equality of all men and women, many of the specific
tactics used to protect slavery strike at the heart of the democratic
process. Laws were adopted across the South to prohibit people from
expressing antislavery views. 186 The "gag rule" in Congress made it

185. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING PRIVILEGE":
STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 131-55 (2000) (describing

actions taken to suppress the antislavery movement, and people's reactions demanding freedom of
speech).
186. See id. at 299 ("The laws protecting slavery from criticism were sedition acts, broadly
defined. They made it a crime to criticize one legal and social institution and to advocate its
abolition.").
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impossible to discuss abolition. 87 Ultimately, both the Constitution of
the United States and the state constitutions were interpreted or amended
to make it impossible to pass antislavery legislation, 8 8 and this in turn
made it impossible to address the great evil of slavery through the
democratic process, leaving the matter to be resolved upon the fields of
battle.
In response to the abolition of slavery and Reconstruction, the
Southern states adopted "Black Codes" denying equal rights to African
Americans,1 89 and there was an uprising of mob violence and terrorism
90
that attempted to return the black race to a state of virtual servitude.'
187. Id. at 180 ("The gag rule had repressed abolitionist petitions, but it also attempted to
silence congressional discussion. It gagged congressmen as well as abolitionists, underlining the
abolitionists' warning that the suppression of their rights implicated the rights of others as well.").
188. See ABRAHAM LINCOLN, II COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 404 (excerpt
from speech at Springfield, Illinois, June 26, 1857), available at www.hti.umich.edu/llincoln (last
visited Aug. 25, 2006). Here is what Abraham Lincoln had to say about how at the time of the
Revolution the law in regard to slavery was different than it was by the time he spoke in 1857:
In those days, as I understand, masters could, at their own pleasure, emancipate their
slaves; but since then, such legal restraints have been made upon emancipation, as to
amount almost to prohibition. In those days, Legislatures held the unquestioned power to
abolish slavery in their respective States; but now it is becoming quite fashionable for
State Constitutions to withhold that power from the Legislatures. In those days, by
common consent, the spread of the black man's bondage to new countries was
prohibited; but now, Congress decides that it will not continue the prohibition, and the
Supreme Court decides that it could not if it would. In those days, our Declaration of
Independence was held sacred by all, and thought to include all; but now, to aid in
making the bondage of the negro universal and eternal, it is assailed, and sneered at, and
construed, and hawked at, and torn, till, if its framers could rise from their graves, they
could not at all recognize it. All the powers of earth seem rapidly combining against him.
Mammon is after him; ambition follows, and philosophy follows, and the Theology of
the day is fast joining the cry. They have him in his prison house; they have searched his
person, and left no prying instrument with him. One after another they have closed the
heavy iron doors upon him, and now they have him, as it were, bolted in with a lock of a
hundred keys, which can never be unlocked without the concurrence of every key; the
keys in the hands of a hundred different men, and they scattered to a hundred different
and distant places; and they stand musing as to what invention, in all the dominions of
mind and matter, can be produced to make the impossibility of his escape more complete
than it is.
Id.
189. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 23 (3d ed. 1974) ("[T]he
provisional legislatures established by President Johnson in 1865 adopted the notorious Black
Codes."); KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION 1865-1877, at 79 (1966) ("[T]he
purpose of the Black Codes was to keep the Negro, as long as possible ... a propertyless rural
laborer, under strict controls, without political rights, and with inferior legal rights.").
190. See STAMPP, supra note 189, at 75 (citing the 1866 report of Carl Schurz, who had been
sent by President Johnson to review the situation in the South, to the effect that "the more brutal
whites committed countless acts of violence against the freedmen"); id. at 199 ("At least as
important a factor as racial demagoguery in the overthrow of the radical regimes [in the 1870s] was
the resort to physical violence.... Organized terrorism was popularly associated with the Ku Klux
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Despite the relative success of the "redeemer" movement against
Reconstruction, the black population of the South continued to vote in
large numbers for two decades,1 9 and was successful in obtaining
representation and influence in state governments.1 92 However, at the
beginning of the twentieth century, another wave of racist mob violence
swept the South, 193 and all of the southern states took steps to
disenfranchise black voters.1 94 The principal mechanism used was the
"Mississippi Plan," which incorporated a series of devices intended to
disqualify and discourage African Americans from voting. 95 As a result
of these laws, as well as the very real threat of private intimidation,
blacks were stripped of the right to vote. 96 For example, as late as the
1950s, less than two percent of African Americans over the age of
twenty were registered to vote in the State of Mississippi. 97 The
disenfranchisement of African Americans in the early years of the
twentieth century was simply a continuation of the pattern established
under slavery. As had been the case in the antebellum South, it was
necessary to subvert the democratic process in order to maintain the
system of white supremacy.
This pattern was repeated again during the latter half of the
twentieth century in reaction to the modem civil rights movement of
African Americans seeking to dismantle the system of apartheid that had
developed in the United States. In addition to committing yet another
wave of racist violence in the 1950s and early 1960s,1 98 the forces of
Klan, formed in Tennessee in 1866, but the Klan was only one of many such organizations, which
included the Knights of the White Camelia, the White Brotherhood, the Palefaces, and the '76
Association.").
191. See WOODWARD, supra note 189, at 53-54 ("It is perfectly true that Negroes were often
coerced, defrauded, or intimidated, but they continued to vote in large numbers in most parts of the
South for more than two decades after Reconstruction.").
192. See id. at 54-65 (describing success of black officeholders and political alliances between
blacks and both the conservative and populist political parties of the South).
193. See id. at 86-87 (describing several attacks by mobs engaged in "looting, murdering, and
lynching").
194. See id. at 83-85 (describing the adoption of various devices disenfranchising black voters
in thirteen states between 1890 and 1915).
195. See id. at 83-84 (describing how property and literacy requirements (with loopholes for
whites such as the "understanding clause," the "grandfather clause," and the "good character
clause," the poll tax, and the "white primary" were used to disenfranchise blacks)).
196. See id. at 85 ("The effectiveness of disenfranchisement is suggested by a comparison of
the number of registered Negro voters in Louisiana in 1896, when there were 130, 334, and in 1904,
when there were 1,342.").
197. See id. at 174.
198. See id at 165-66 (describing wave of repression across the South and events at Little
Rock in 1958); id. at 173-74 (describing the State of Mississippi in the 1950s as a "police state"
where "Negroes lived in constant fear and its whites under rigid conformity to dogmas of white
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segregation not only attempted to repeal hard-won civil rights legislation
and policies, but they also sought to make it impossible to adopt such
legislation or policies in the first place.' 99 The Supreme Court responded
by ruling in a series of cases that although it is constitutional for the
government to repeal civil rights laws, it is unconstitutional to alter the
governmental decision-makingprocess to make it more difficult for civil
rights laws to be adopted than it is for other types of legislation. In a

series of cases-Reitman v. Mulkey, 200 Hunter v. Erickson,20 1 and
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 120 2-the Supreme Court
struck down discriminatory laws that placed roadblocks in the way of
the adoption of civil rights statutes and policies, and the state action
doctrine figured prominently in the reasoning of the Court.
B.

The Supreme Court'sResponse to Anti-Civil Rights Legislation

In Reitman v. Mulkey, the Supreme Court struck down a California
state constitutional amendment, Proposition 14, which provided that no
state or local law could be adopted which would interfere with "the right
of any person ... to decline to sell, lease, or rent [his or her] property to

such persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.' 20 3 Proposition
14 was adopted in reaction to statewide fair housing laws, including the
Unruh Act and the Rumford Acts, which had been recently promulgated
by the state legislature.20 4 Not only did Proposition 14 repeal the new
supremacy as interpreted by a state-subsidized Citizens Council"); id. at 174-75 (describing the
Battle of Oxford); id. at 177-79 (describing the Birmingham atrocities, the murder of Medgar Evers,
and other acts of interracial violence).
199. See id at 154-63 (describing steps taken in many southern states against court-ordered
integration, including the adoption of private school plans, nullification measures, laws penalizing
school board officials and school districts who attempted desegregation, transfer of responsibility
over assignment of pupils to local authorities, and stating, "by the end of the year [1956] eleven
southern states had placed a total of 106 pro-segregation measures on their law books").
200. 387 U.S. 380-81 (1967) (invalidating California state constitutional amendment making it
unconstitutional for the state or any political subdivision to adopt fair housing law).
201. 393 U.S. 392-93 (1969) (invalidating Akron city charter amendment requiring that any
fair housing ordinance be approved by a referendum of the voters).
202. 458 U.S. 457, 500-01 (1982) (invalidating Washington initiative prohibiting
transportation of students for reasons other than special education, overcrowding, or lack of
necessary physical facilities).
203. See Reitman, 387 U.S. at 371 (quoting state constitutional amendment which provided
that "[n]either the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or abridge, directly
or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desires to sell, lease or rent any part or all of
his real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to such person or persons as he, in his
absolute discretion, chooses").
204. See id. at 374.
The Unruh Act, on which respondents based their cases, was passed in 1959. The
Hawkins Act ... followed and prohibited discriminations in publicly assisted housing. In
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fair housing laws, but it also prohibited the adoption of any fair housing
law anywhere in the state of California. 20 5 The Supreme Court ruled that
although the people of California were allowed to repeal fair housing
laws, they were not permitted to withdraw the power to adopt this type
of law from the state legislature. °6
The state action doctrine was central to the Court's reasoning in
Reitman in that it was used to explain the difference between repealing a
civil rights law and making a civil rights law unconstitutional. The Court
ruled that although mere repeal of fair housing laws might not constitute
unconstitutional state action, making fair housing laws unconstitutional
went too far towards encouraging private acts of racial discrimination.20 7
1961, the legislature enacted proscriptions against restrictive covenants. Finally, in 1963,
came the Rumford Fair Housing Act, superseding the Hawkins Act and prohibiting racial
discriminations in the sale or rental of any private dwelling containing more than four
units.
Id. (citations omitted).
205. See id.
It was against this background that Proposition 14 was enacted. Its immediate design and
intent, the California court said, were "to overturn state laws that bore on the right of
private sellers and lessors to discriminate," the Unruh and Rumford Acts, and "to
forestall future state action that might circumscribe this right." This aim was successfully
achieved: the adoption of Proposition 14 "generally nullifies both the Rumford and
Unruh Acts as they apply to the housing market," and establishes "a purported
constitutional right to privately discriminate on grounds which admittedly would be
unavailable under the Fourteenth Amendment should state action be involved."
Id. (emphasis omitted).
206, See id. at 376 ("As we understand the California court, it did not posit a constitutional
violation on the mere repeal of the Unruh and Rumford Acts.... The California court could very
reasonably conclude that [Proposition 14] would and did have wider impact than a mere repeal of
existing statutes."); see also id. at 380-81.
Here we are dealing with a provision which does not just repeal an existing law
forbidding private racial discriminations. [Proposition 14] was intended to authorize, and
does authorize, racial discrimination in the housing market. The right to discriminate is
now one of the basic policies of the State. The California Supreme Court believes that the
section will significantly encourage and involve the State in private discriminations. We
have been presented with no persuasive considerations indicating that these judgments
should be overturned.
Id. at 380-81.
207. Seeid.at377.
Unruh and Rumford were thereby pro tanto repealed. But the section struck more deeply
and more widely. Private discriminations in housing were now not only free from
Rumford and Unruh but they also enjoyed a far different status than was true before the
passage of those statutes. The right to discriminate, including the right to discriminate on
racial grounds, was now embodied in the State's basic charter, immune from legislative,
executive, or judicial regulation at any level of the state government. Those practicing
racial discriminations need no longer rely solely on their personal choice. They could
now invoke express constitutional authority, free from censure or interference of any kind
from official sources.
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The Supreme Court reached this conclusion by applying the state action
standard from Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority, which required
the Court to determine the extent of governmental involvement in acts of
private discrimination.2 °8 The Court explicitly found that by making fair
housing laws unconstitutional, Proposition 14 would "significantly
encourage and involve the State in private discriminations., 20 9 Recast in
the terminology that is currently used by the Court, the mere repeal of
civil rights legislation amounts to no more than "acquiescence" in
private acts of discrimination, which is not in itself "state action,"
whereas impeding the enactment of fair housing legislation through the
adoption of a constitutional amendment constitutes "encouragement" of
private acts of discrimination, which is state action.210
There are two reasons why the Court's use of the state action
doctrine to explain the difference between "mere repeal" and "changing
the structure of the democratic process" seems unsatisfactory. First of
all, the repeal of a law, like the adoption of a law, is quintessential state
action. When a law is repealed, the state has undeniably acted to change
people's legal rights and responsibilities. A second difficulty with the
explanation offered by the Court in Reitman is that it is difficult to
imagine any action which would "encourage" racial discrimination more
than the repeal of a nondiscrimination law. What the people of
California did in repealing the Unruh Act was to legalize racial
discrimination in the real estate market. It is undeniable that race was "a
motivating factor" in the repeal of this legislation, making the repeal an
act of "purposeful discrimination., 21 1 Accordingly, the implication that
208. Seeid. at 378-79.
This Court has never attempted the "impossible task" of formulating an infallible test for
determining whether the State "in any of its manifestations" has become significantly
involved in private discriminations. "Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances"
on a case-by-case basis can a "nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be
attributed its true significance." Here the California court, armed as it was with the
knowledge of the facts and circumstances concerning the passage and potential impact of
[Proposition 14], and familiar with the milieu in which that provision would operate, has
determined that the provision would involve the State in private racial discriminations to
an unconstitutional degree. We accept this holding of the California court.
Id. (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961)) (citations omitted).
209. See id. at 381 ("The California Supreme Court believes that the section will significantly
encourage and involve the State in private discriminations. We have been presented with no
persuasive considerations indicating that these judgments should be overturned.").
210. See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text (explaining that "mere acquiescence" of
government in violation of constitutional rights by private parties is not state action, while
"encouragement" of such violation is state action).
211. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (upholding writing skill test for
applicants to police department against Equal Protection challenge on the ground that the test was
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the action of the people in repealing the fair housing law merely
"acquiesced" in private acts of discrimination is unconvincing.
A more straightforward explanation of the decision in Reitman is
simply that the people have the right to return to the constitutional
baseline, but that they do not have the right to create different rules for
different people for the enactment of legislation. Legislation that was
vitally important to African Americans and other minority groups was
blocked by Proposition 14 as no other similar legislation was. The state
action doctrine stands for the proposition that, so far as the Constitution
is concerned, the people are free to remain at, go beyond, or return to the
constitutional baseline. Coupled with the Equal Protection Clause, the
state action doctrine also stands for the proposition that laws may not
prevent the people, acting through the democratic process, from deciding
to protect minority rights over and above the constitutional baseline.
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court clarified its rationale,
expressly holding that the law may not restructure or distort the
governmental decisionmaking process to the detriment of minority
groups. In Hunter v. Erickson the citizens of the city of Akron, Ohio,
adopted an amendment to the city charter which repealed a recently
enacted fair housing ordinance, and which required that any future
ordinance which "regulates the ...sale ...

of real property ...on the

basis of race ... must first be approved by a majority of the electors
voting on the question .... ,21 2 Justice White, speaking for the Court,
explained that while it was constitutional for the people of Akron to
repeal the fair housing ordinance, it was not constitutional to adopt a
different procedure for the adoption of fair housing laws.2t 3 Justice
not utilized for a discriminatory purpose, stating that, "our cases have not embraced the proposition
that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory
purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact"); Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Auth. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977) (upholding
municipality's refusal to allow multifamily dwellings on ground that its refusal was not proven to be
motivated by racial discrimination, stating that, "[w]hen there is a proof that a discriminatory
purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision, this judicial deference is no longer justified").
212. 393 U.S. 385, 387 (1969). The city charter amendment provided:
Any ordinance enacted by the Council of The City of Akron which regulates the use,
sale, advertisement, transfer, listing assignment, lease, sublease or financing of real
property of any kind or of any interest therein on the basis of race, color, religion,
national origin or ancestry must first be approved by a majority of the electors voting on
the question at a regular or general election before said ordinance shall be effective. Any
such ordinance in effect at the time of the adoption of this section shall cease to be
effective until approved by the electors as provided herein.

Id.
213. See id. at 389-90, 390 n.5 ("[T]he City of Akron... not only suspended the operation of
the existing ordinance forbidding housing discrimination, but also required the approval of the
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White stated: "[T]he State may no more disadvantage any particular
group by making it more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf than it
may dilute any person's vote or give
any group a smaller representation
2 14
than another of comparable size.,
Another case following the same line of reasoning involved the
constitutionality of a ballot measure which was a backlash against

busing for integration of the public schools. Voters in the state of
Washington reacted against a voluntary school integration plan designed

by the Seattle School District 2 5 by adopting Initiative 350, which
prohibited any school district from transporting students past
neighboring schools or redrawing attendance zones for integrative
purposes unless required by the Constitution.21 6 Once again, this follows
the pattern that was established in Reitman and Hunter of a backlash
against official policies protecting a minority group, and once again, the
electors before any future ordinance could take effect.... Thus we do not hold that mere repeal of
an existing ordinance violates the Fourteenth Amendment.").
214. See id. at 392-93.
Even though Akron might have proceeded by majority vote at town meeting on all its
municipal legislation, it has instead chosen a more complex system. Having done so, the
State may no more disadvantage any particular group by making it more difficult to
enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any person's vote or give any group a
smaller representation than another of comparable size.
Id.
215. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 461 ("[In March 1978, the
School Board enacted the so-called 'Seattle Plan' for desegregation. The plan, which makes
extensive use of busing and mandatory reassignments, desegregates elementary schools by 'pairing'
and 'triading' predominantly minority with predominantly white attendance areas, and by basing
student assignments on attendance zones rather than on race.").
216. Seeid. at462.
[The opponents of busing for integration] drafted a statewide initiative designed to
terminate the use of mandatory busing for purposes of racial integration. This proposal,
known as Initiative 350, provided that "no school board ... shall directly or indirectly
require any student to attend a school other than the school which is geographically
nearest or next nearest the student's place of residence ... and which offers the course of
study pursued by such student... The initiative then set out, however, a number of
broad exceptions to this requirement: a student may be assigned beyond his
neighborhood school if he "requires special education, care or guidance," or if "there are
health or safety hazards, either natural or man made, or physical barriers or
obstacles ... between the student's place of residence and the nearest or next nearest
school," or if "the school nearest or next nearest to his place of residence is unfit or
inadequate because of overcrowding, unsafe conditions or lack of physical facilities."
Initiative 350 also specifically proscribed use of seven enumerated methods of
"indirec[t]" student assignment-among them the redefinition of attendance zones, the
pairing of schools, and the use of "feeder" schools-that are a part of the Seattle Plan.
The initiative envisioned busing for racial purposes in only one circumstance: it did not
purport to "prevent any court of competent jurisdiction from adjudicating constitutional
issues relating to the public schools."
Id. (citations omitted).
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Supreme Court ruled that while the voters have the right to repeal civil
rights policies, they do not have the right to restructure the governmental
decisionmaking process to make it more difficult to adopt such policies.
Justice Powell laid out the reasoning of the Court:
We are also satisfied that the practical effect of Initiative 350 is to
work a reallocation of power of the kind condemned in Hunter. The
initiative removes the authority to address a racial problem-and only
a racial problem-from the existing decisionmaking body, in such a
way as to burden minority interests. Those favoring the elimination of
de facto school segregation now must seek relief from the state
legislature, or from the statewide electorate. Yet authority over all
other student assignment decisions, as well as over most other areas of
educational policy, remains vested in the local school board. Indeed,
by specifically exempting from Initiative 350's proscriptions most
nonracial reasons for assigning students away from their neighborhood
schools, the initiative expressly requires those championing school
integration to surmount a considerably higher hurdle than persons
seeking comparable legislative action.
In the last decade, a new civil rights movement has emerged,
demanding an end to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
As homosexuals have achieved political gains and legislative victories,
our society has witnessed a furious backlash, attempting not only to
undo the progress that homosexuals have achieved, but to make it
difficult or impossible for equal rights legislation and policies to be
adopted. The Supreme Court addressed this problem in Romer v.
Evans,218 in which the Court considered the constitutionality of a
Colorado state constitutional amendment (Amendment 2) that was
adopted in reaction to municipal ordinances and governmental directives
219
forbidding discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
Amendment 2 prohibited the state and any of its subdivisions from

217. Id. at474.
218. 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (invalidating Colorado state constitutional amendment
prohibiting state and local governments from enacting antidiscrimination measures protecting
homosexuals).
219. Seeid. at 623-24.
The impetus for the amendment and the contentious campaign that preceded its adoption
came in large part from ordinances that had been passed in various Colorado
municipalities. For example, the cities of Aspen and Boulder and the city and County of
Denver each had enacted ordinances which banned discrimination in many transactions
and activities, including housing, employment, education, public accommodations, and
health and welfare services.
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adopting nondiscrimination laws protecting homosexuals.22 ° In striking
down Amendment 2, Justice Kennedy cogently phrased the legal
principle in the following terms: "A law declaring that in general it shall
be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid
from the government is221itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in
the most literal sense.,
C. The Principleof Democratic Choice and the "Mere
Repeal/Distortionof GovernmentalProcess" Dichotomy
In summary, the decisions of the Supreme Court in this line of
cases reflect the central importance of the principle of democratic choice
within the state action doctrine. The Constitution requires that no law
may allow society to drop below the constitutional baseline, a baseline
that is set by the principles of Equal Protection with respect to the
actions of government, and by the Thirteenth Amendment with respect
to the actions of individuals. The Constitution permits our society to
remain at the constitutional baseline, and therefore society does not have
the affirmative duty to enact civil rights legislation. Furthermore, it is
constitutional to repeal civil rights laws and policies, and thereby return
to the constitutional baseline. To this extent, society is allowed to
"backslide." However, the state action doctrine, coupled with the Equal
Protection Clause, makes it unconstitutional to make it more difficult to
adopt civil rights laws and policies than it is to adopt other similar laws
and policies. This interpretation of the state action doctrine is consistent
with the principle of democratic choice. It is up to the people acting
through the democratic process to decide how fair, how tolerant, and
how equal individuals must be in their treatment of each other. Any laws
which interfere with the fair operation of the democratic process in the
protection of fundamental rights are themselves unconstitutional state
action.

220.

See id. at 624. Amendment 2 provided:

No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation. Neither the
State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its agencies,
political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any
statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis
of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota
preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution
shall be in all respects self-executing.
Id.
221.

1d.at633.
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The following portion of this Article concerns another aspect of the
state action doctrine, namely the power of Congress to adopt civil rights
laws protecting people against acts of private discrimination.
VI.

THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE AND THE ENFORCEMENT CLAUSE

The fourth aspect of the state action doctrine concerns the proper
interpretation of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, called the
"Enforcement Clause." This constitutional provision grants Congress the
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Since 1883 in the Civil
Rights Cases,222 the Supreme Court has interpreted the Enforcement
Clause as empowering Congress to redress and remedy "state action"
only, and the Court has held that the provision does not confer power
upon Congress to directly regulate the actions of private individuals and
organizations.223 Like the elder Justice John Harlan, who dissented in the
Civil Rights Cases,224 Justice Clark, who wrote a concurring opinion in
United States v. Guest,225 and Justice Breyer, who dissented in United
States v. Morrison,22 6 I conclude that this interpretation of Section 5 is
mistaken, and that the Enforcement Clause was intended to give
Congress the power to redress private as well as public invasions of
constitutional rights. A number of constitutional scholars have reached
the same conclusion.22 7

222. 109 U.S. 24-26 (1883) (striking down federal Civil Rights Act of 1875).
223. See id. at 11; see also text accompanying note 287 infra.
224. 109 U.S. 3, 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (concluding that Congress does have power to
reach private conduct under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
225. 383 U.S. 745, 762 (1966) (Clark, J., concurring) ("[I]t is, I believe, both appropriate and
necessary under the circumstances here to say that there now can be no doubt that the specific
language of § 5 empowers the Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies-with or without
state action-that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights.").
226. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 664 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("I need
not consider Congress's authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment [to reach private
conduct]. Nonetheless, I doubt the Court's reasoning rejecting that source of authority.").
227. See, e.g., Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil
War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 863, 869 (1986) ("[T]he framers [of the Fourteenth
Amendment] intended to grant Congress authority to protect the fundamental rights of all American
citizens, regardless of the source of the infringement."); Barry Sullivan, Comment, Historical
Reconstruction, Reconstruction History, and the Proper Scope of Section 1981, 98 YALE L.J. 541,
545 (1989) ("[T]he historical materials provide ample support for the Court's holding that the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 was intended to reach private, as well as official, discrimination."). See
for Justice,
generally Nathan Newman & J.J. Gass, Judicial Independence Series, Brennan Center
,
th
NYU School of Law, A New Birth of Freedom: The ForgottenHistory of the 13th 14h, and 1 5
Amendments, at 11, www.brennancenter.org/resources/ji/ji5.pdf (last visited Aug. 26, 2005)
(concluding that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to grant Congress the power to
redress both state action and private action which interferes with fundamental rights). See also Alan
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The Supreme Court's misreading of Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment stems from its misunderstanding of the purpose of the state
action doctrine. At the core of the Court's mishandling of this matter is
its lack of respect for the principle of democratic choice, which ought to
be the animating principle for interpretation of the state action
component of the Fourteenth Amendment. In this instance, democratic
choice stands for the right of the people, through their federal
representatives, to adopt nationwide protections for civil rights. In ruling
that Congress lacks this power, and as a consequence, in invalidating
civil rights legislation, the Court has, time and again, delayed or denied
justice to our most vulnerable citizens, who believed they had obtained
federal protection from acts of discrimination or oppression at the hands
of private parties.
What follows is the textual argument employed by the Supreme
Court in finding that Congress lacks the authority to regulate private
conduct under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A.

Textual Basis andJudicialInterpretationof the State Action
Requirement of the Enforcement Clause

The language of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment confers
vast power upon the Congress to adopt legislation protecting liberty and
ensuring equality. It states: "Congress shall have the power, by
appropriate legislation, to enforce the provisions of this Article," the
term "this Article" referring to the foregoing provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment, including the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. In the Civil
Rights Cases,228 the Supreme Court interpreted Section 5 as granting
Congress the power to regulate "state action," but not the power to
regulate the actions of private individuals and organizations. 229 The Civil
Rights Cases involved the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of
in all "inns, public
1875, which prohibited discrimination

R. Madry, Private Accountability and the Fourteenth Amendment; State Action, Federalism and
Congress,59 MO. L. REv. 499, 505 (1994).

Congress may create a private cause of action between private parties when, because a
state is likely to be unwilling to protect the interest, the Supreme Court's review would
provide inadequate protection. Judgment in a private cause of action would be the
premise for federal enforcement of those rights.
Id.
228.
229.

109 U.S. 3, 24-26 (1883) (invalidating Civil Rights Act of 1875).
See text accompanying note 223 supra.
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230
conveyances,.., theaters, and other places of public amusement.,
The Supreme Court ruled that Congress lacked the authority to adopt
this statute under Section 5 because it constituted an attempt to regulate
the behavior of private parties.2 31 In describing the effect of the
Enforcement Clause upon the power of Congress to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court looked to Section 1 of the
Amendment, which declares that "[n]o state shall" abridge the privileges
and immunities of citizens, deprive people of due process, nor deny
them equal protection.2 32 In light of the fact that Section 1 operates as a
prohibition on the states, the Court reasoned:

[T]he last section of the amendment invests congress with power to
enforce it by appropriate legislation. To enforce what? To enforce the
prohibition. To adopt appropriate legislation for correcting the effects
of such prohibited state law and state acts, and thus to render them
effectually null, void, and innocuous. This is the legislative power
conferred upon congress, and this is the whole of it. It does not invest
congress with power to legislate upon subjects which are within the
domain of state legislation; but to provide modes of relief against state
legislation, or state action, of the kind referred to. It does not authorize
congress to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private
rights; but to provide modes of redress against the operation of state
laws, and the action of state officers, executive or judicial, when these
of the fundamental rights specified in the
are subversive
233
amendment.

The Supreme Court was correct in finding that it is a permissible
interpretation of the text of the Fourteenth Amendment to conclude that
Congress has no power under Section 5 to regulate private conduct. As
discussed in the following portion of this Article, however, it was an
egregious misinterpretation of the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

230. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 9. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875
provided:
That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full
and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of
inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public
amusement; subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and
applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition
of servitude.

Id.
231.
232.
233.

Seeid. atll.
See id.
Id.
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B. Intent of the Framers of the FourteenthAmendment with Respect to
Enforcement Power

It is clear that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to give
Congress the power to enact civil rights legislation directed at
individuals. After the Civil War, Congress found it necessary to directly

regulate the actions of individuals and private organizations during the
Reconstruction period because of the gross, persistent, and widespread
234
violations of rights which were then occurring throughout the South.
This was the conclusion of Justice Harlan, who wrote in his dissenting
opinion in the Civil Rights Cases:
It was perfectly well known that the great danger to the equal
enjoyment by citizens of their rights, as citizens, was to be
apprehended, not altogether from unfriendly state legislation, but from
the hostile action of corporations and individuals in the states. And it is
to be presumed that it was intended, by that section [Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment],
to clothe congress with power and authority
235
to meet that danger.
Justice Harlan concluded that the majority of the Supreme Court had
evaded the purpose of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by means
of "a subtle and ingenious verbal mechanism; '236 in short, that in
234. See the remarks of Senator George F. Edmunds, denying that the Fourteenth Amendment
was "a mere negative declaration, a kind of admonitory prohibition to a State," inapplicable "when
criminals go unpunished by the score, by the hundred, and by the thousand, when justice sits silent
in her temple in the States, or is driven from it altogether .. " CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong, Ist Sess.
697 (1871), reprinted in Avins, supra note 119, at 563; Sullivan, supra note 227, at 549 ("The
Black Codes enacted by the Southern states under Presidential Reconstruction, as well as
widespread acts of private discrimination and violence against the Freedmen, convinced Republican
leaders that legislative action was needed."); SCATURRO, supra note 126, at 84 ("[T]he central
problem facing Congress during Reconstruction was private action ...").
235. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 54 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
236. See id at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan stated:
The opinion in these cases proceeds, as it seems to me, upon grounds entirely too narrow
and artificial. The substance and spirit of the recent amendments of the constitution have
been sacrificed by a subtle and ingenious verbal criticism. "It is not the words of the law
but the internal sense of it that makes the law. The letter of the law is the body; the sense
and reason of the law is the soul." Constitutional provisions, adopted in the interest of
liberty, and for the purpose of securing, through national legislation, if need be, rights
inhering in a state of freedom, and belonging to American citizenship, have been so
construed as to defeat the ends the people desired to accomplish, which they attempted to
accomplish, and which they supposed they had accomplished by changes in their
fundamental law. By this I do not mean that the determination of these cases should have
been materially controlled by considerations of mere expediency or policy. I mean only,
in this form, to express an earnest conviction that the court has departed from the
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applying the state action doctrine to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court improperly elevated textual arguments over the
intent of the framers. 237 A number of constitutional historians agree with
Justice Harlan's conclusion on this point.238
familiar rule requiring, in the interpretation of constitutional provisions, that full effect
be given to the intent with which they were adopted.
Id.
237.

See WILSON R. HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 159-64 (2002) (describing

conflicts between legal arguments based upon text and intent).
238. See authorities cited supra note 229; Akhil Reed Amar, Substance and Method in the Year
2000, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 601, 619-20 (2001) (criticizing the Supreme Court for failing to accord
appropriate respect to the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment and to Justice Harlan). Amar
states:
Many of these Congressmen had been leading architects of the Amendment itself. Why
doesn't William Rehnquist accord these men any epistemic respect? Founders like James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson, who lived and died as slaveholders, are treated with
reverence by the Court (even though Jefferson was not even in America at the
Founding). Why are Reconstructors like John Bingham and Charles Sumner, crusaders
for racial justice, treated with so much less respect?
And what about the first Justice Harlan? After all, he dissented in the Civil Rights Cases,
arguing that Congress had broad Prigg-ish power to address even certain private
conduct, and that the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had no stateaction requirement. This is the same Harlan who later dissented in Plessy. If he was right
in Plessy, perhaps he might have been right here. To pass over him in silence, as
Rehnquist does, is to disrespect a great Justice. In other opinions, Harlan insisted that the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights against the states; that the federal
government was bound by the principle of equal citizenship (a kind of reverseincorporation); that free expression meant more than the ban on prior restraints; that the
Bill of Rights protected brown-skinned folk in the territories; and that the Court could
not simply ignore the Fifteenth Amendment in the face of massive southern
disfranchisement. In all of these contexts, Harlan's opinions--often in dissent-have
stood the test of time better than the majority opinions of his Gilded Age colleagues
whom the Chief now privileges.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United
States v. Morrison, 114 HARV. L. REV. 135, 153 (2000). MacKinnon states:
The Congress that passed the Fourteenth Amendment clearly intended thereby to ensure
the constitutionality of legislation designed to reach racist atrocities committed by one
citizen against another that the states were not addressing. Although the text of the
Fourteenth Amendment addresses states, Congress incontestably intended to create
authority for federal legislation against private as well as state acts that deprived citizens
of equal rights on a racial basis.
Id. (footnotes omitted). The constitutional historian Frank J. Scaturro quotes two significant
historical figures regarding the failure of the Supreme Court to honor the intent of the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Henry B. Brown, the author of the Court's 1896 opinion in Plessy
v. Ferguson, is quoted as admitting in 1912 that "there is still a lingering doubt whether the spirit of
the [Reconstruction] amendments was not sacrificed to the letter." SCATURRO, supra note 126, at
130 (quoting CHARLES F. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION
251 n.21 (1987)). Scaturro also quotes the following remarks of Frederick Douglass:
In the dark days of slavery, this Court, on all occasions, gave the greatest importance to
intention as a guide to interpretation.... Everything in favor of slavery and against the
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The Supreme Court reviewed the historical evidence regarding the
intent of the framers of the Enforcement Clause in City of Boerne v.
239
Flores. In Boerne, Chief Justice Rehnquist's primary argument for
narrowly construing the power of Congress to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment was based upon the drafting history of the Amendment in
Congress. 240 The Chief Justice considered it to be of great significance
that the initial draft of the Fourteenth Amendment, offered in February,
1866, which contained a very explicit grant of power to Congress to
enforce civil rights, was rejected by Congress and replaced with the
current language. 24' The Chief Justice states: "Members of Congress
from across the political spectrum criticized the Amendment, and the
criticisms had a common theme: The proposed Amendment gave
Congress too much legislative power at the expense of the existing

negro was settled by this object and intention.... Where slavery was strong, liberty is
now weak.
0 for a Supreme Court of the United States which shall be as true to the claims of
humanity, as the Supreme Court formerly was to the demands of slavery! When that day
comes, as come it will, a Civil Rights Bill will not be declared unconstitutional and void,
in utter and flagrant disregard of the objects and intentions of the National legislature by
which it was enacted, and of the rights plainly secured by the Constitution.
Id. at 207 (quoting FREDERICK DOUGLASS, THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS, Epigraph at 119-20
(1991)).
239. 521 U.S. 507, 533-36 (1997) (declaring federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act
unconstitutional as beyond Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
240. See id. at 520, 521-24 ("The Fourteenth Amendment's history confirms the remedial,
rather than substantive, nature of the Enforcement Clause.").
241. The initial draft of the Fourteenth Amendment, offered in February, 1866, stated:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to
secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
States, and to all persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life,
liberty, and property.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866).
This language was ultimately replaced with the language used in Section I and Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment:
Section 1: All persons bom or naturalized within the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.

Section 5: The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol34/iss4/5

54

Huhn: The State Action Doctrine and the Principle of Democratic Choice
2006]

THE STA TE ACTION DOCTRINE

1433

constitutional structure. 24 2 The problem with the historical analysis of
Chief Justice Rehnquist in Boerne is that it is rebutted by the words and
the actions of two significant figures: Representative John A. Bingham
and Representative Giles W. Hotchkiss.
Representative Bingham drafted the language contained in the
February 1866 version of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
Representative Hotchkiss was the last member of the House to speak to
the measure before a vote was taken to postpone consideration of it.
Although a number of persons opposed to Reconstruction were
concerned that the language of the February draft conferred too much
power upon Congress, this was not the concern of Representative
Hotchkiss, a supporter of Reconstruction,243 who was instead concerned
that Bingham's original language placed sole power in the Congress to
protect civil rights.244 In addition to granting Congress the power to
protect fundamental rights, Hotchkiss wanted the Constitution to forbid
any state interference with these rights. Hotchkiss was not arguing
against Congressional power to protect civil rights. Hotchkiss stated:
Now, I desire that the very privileges for which the gentleman is
contending shall be secured to the citizens; but I want them secured by
a constitutional amendment that legislation cannot override. Then if
the gentleman [Bingham] wishes to go further, and provide by laws
245 of
Congress for the enforcement of these rights, I will go with him.
After warning that if the opposing party gained control of Congress,
this measure would allow the diminution of protection for fundamental
rights, Hotchkiss stated, "Place these guarantees in the Constitution in
such a way that they cannot be stripped from us by any accident, and I
will go with the gentleman." 246 Driving home the point that Bingham's
initial draft did not go far enough in its protection of civil rights,
Hotchkiss added:
Mr. Speaker, I make these remarks because I do not wish to be placed
in the wrong upon this question. I think the gentleman from Ohio [Mr.
242. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
243. See SCATURRO, supra note 126, at 80-81 (indicating that although there was opposition to
Bingham's initial draft of the Fourteenth Amendment upon the ground of states' rights, among
Republicans who supported Reconstruction, only Representative Columbus Delano expressed such
a sentiment).

244. See id. at 96 ("Hotchkiss' argument was based largely on the belief that Bingham's
proposal was insufficient to secure rights, particularly because it was subject to changing
congressional majorities.").
245. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866).
246. Id.
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Bingham] is not sufficiently radical in his views upon this subject. I
think he is a conservative. [Laughter.] I do not make the remark in any
offensive sense. But I want him to go the root of this matter.
His amendment is not as strong as the Constitution now is. The
Constitution now gives equal rights to a certain extent to all citizens.
This amendment provides that Congress may pass laws to enforce
these rights. Why not provide by an amendment to the Constitution
that no State shall discriminate against any class of its citizens; and let
that amendment stand as a part of the organic law of the land, subject
only to be defeated by another constitutional amendment. We may pass
laws here to-day, and the next Congress may wipe them out. Where is
your guarantee then?
Let us have a little time to compare our views upon this subject, and
agree upon an amendment that shall secure beyond question what the
gentleman desires to secure. It is with that view,247and no other, that I
shall vote to postpone this subject for the present.
Following Hotchkiss's remarks, the House of Representatives,
Bingham included, voted overwhelmingly to postpone consideration of
the measure,248 and the Fourteenth Amendment was eventually
submitted to a committee for revision. 249 Justice Hugo Black takes up
the history of the drafting from that point in his dissenting opinion from
2 0
Adamson v. California.
1 Justice Black, referring to John Bingham as
251
"the Madison of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment,
noted that Bingham proposed the language that became the second
sentence of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment 2 Later, during the
Forty-second Congress, Bingham delivered what is perhaps his most
memorable speech relating to the purpose behind the Fourteenth
Amendment. At that time Congress was considering the Ku Klux Klan
Act, which was intended to prevent individuals and groups of
individuals from intimidating people in the exercise of their fundamental

247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See Benjamin B. Kendrick, The Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on
Reconstruction (1914); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 103 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).

250. 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (adopting principle of selective incorporation of Bill of Rights into
Fourteenth Amendment, as opposed to Hugo Black's total incorporation approach).

251. Id. at 73-74 (Black, J., dissenting) ("Yet Congressman Bingham may, without
extravagance, be called the Madison of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
252. Id.at 103.
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rights, 253 and the issue being debated was whether Congress had the
constitutional authority to enact that law. In the course of that address, in
response to remarks by Representative Farnsworth, Bingham observed
that Congress had no less power under the final version of the
Fourteenth Amendment than it had under the proposed language of
February, 1866:
Mr. Speaker, the honorable gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Farnsworth]
did me unwittingly, great service, when he ventured to ask me why I
changed the form of the first section of the fourteenth article of
amendment from the form in which I reported it to the House in
February, 1866, from the Committee on Reconstruction. I will answer
the gentleman, sir, and answer him truthfully. I had the honor to frame
the amendment as reported in February, 1866, and the first section, as
it now stands, letter for letter and syllable for syllable, in the fourteenth
article of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States, save
the introductory clause defining citizens. The clause defining citizens
never came from the joint Committee on Reconstruction, but the
residue of the first section of the fourteenth amendment did come from
the committee precisely as I wrote it and offered it in the Committee
on Reconstruction, and precisely as it now stands in the
Constitution....
The Fourteenth Amendment concludes as follows: "The Congress
shall have power, by appropriate legislation, to enforce the provisions
of this article."
That is the grant of power. It is full and complete. The gentleman
says that amendment differs from the amendment reported by me in
February; differs from the provision introduced and written by me,
now in the fourteenth article of amendments. It differs in this: that it is
now, as it now stands in the Constitution, more comprehensive than as
1866. It embraces all
it was first proposed and reported in February,
• .254
and more than did the February proposition.

253.

See Linda E. Fisher, Anatomy of an Affirmative Duty to Protect: 42 U.S.C. Section 1986,

56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 461, 463 (1999) (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 1986, the Civil Rights Act of
1871, also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, positing that "Section 1986, the subject of this Article,
imposes perhaps the strongest affirmative duty of any piece of legislation arising from the Civil
War," and that "it demonstrates the extent to which Congress reached, pursuant to the enforcement
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to attempt to eradicate Ku Klux Klan violence during
Reconstruction").
254. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 83 (1871), reprintedin Avins, supra note 119,
at 509.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist misread the legislative history of the
Fourteenth Amendment by failing to accord sufficient weight to the
statements of Representatives Hotchkiss and Bingham.255 As a result, the
Chief Justice adopted a restricted interpretation of Congress's power
under Section 5. In Boerne, speaking through the Chief Justice, the
Court announced the rule that federal legislation enacted under Section 5
of the Amendment must be "congruent with" and "proportionate to" the
Supreme Court's understanding of what constitutes a violation of
Section 1.256 The consequence of this rule is that if the Court does not
deem certain conduct a violation of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, then the Congress is very limited in its power to regulate or
prohibit the conduct. In so ruling, the Chief Justice essentially
overturned the principle that the Court announced in 1966 in the case of
Katzenbach v. Morgan,257 in which the Court stated that under Section 5
Congress had discretion to determine what legislation was necessary and
proper for the protection of fundamental rights. 258 Several legal scholars
have correctly noted that the Court's opinion in Boerne represents a
"juricentric" view of Constitutional enforcement that denigrates the role
259
of Congress in protecting our fundamental freedoms.
In particular, by preserving the "congruence" between Section 1
and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has
prevented Congress from enacting laws governing the actions of private
individuals and corporations under Section 5, because the Court has
interpreted Section 1 to apply only to "state action.,, 260 As noted
previously, the problem with this reading of the Fourteenth Amendment
is that it is totally at odds with the intent of the framers of that

255. See Amar, supra note 238, at 619; see also SCATURRO, supra note 126, at 96 (remarking
that the constitutional historian Alfred Avins "seriously misstates the congressman's [Hotchkiss']
views").
256. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 508, 520 ("The Fourteenth Amendment's history confirms the
remedial, rather than substantive, nature of the Enforcement Clause.").
257. 348 U.S. 641, 643-45 (1966) (upholding provision of Voting Rights Act which outlawed
English literacy requirement).
258. See id. at 651 ("Correctly viewed, § 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing
Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure
the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment."); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 527-28 (discussing and
distinguishing Morgan).
259. See generally Rebecca E. Zietlow, Juriscentrism and the Original Meaning of Section
Five, 13 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 485, 486 (2004); see also Amar, supra note 238, at 605
("The Reconstruction Republicans aimed to give Congress broad power to declare and define the
fundamental rights-the privileges and immunities-of American citizens above and beyond the
floor set by courts.").
260. See supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text (discussing the Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883)); infra notes 336-41 (discussing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (1999)).
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Amendment. Section 1 and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
were not intended to be "congruent" in this respect.
It is beyond debate that the Reconstruction Congress, which
adopted the Fourteenth Amendment, passionately believed that the
Amendment gave it the power to adopt remedial legislation directed at
individuals and private corporations in order to protect the fundamental
rights of American citizens. We know that this is true because the
members of the Reconstruction Congress repeatedly said so and because
they repeatedly exercised this power by enacting laws governing the
actions of private parties.
After the Civil War, the Reconstruction Congress was faced with
the task of protecting the newly freed slaves from violence and
intimidation at the hands of their former masters. Representative
Bingham directly addressed the question regarding the power of
Congress under Section 5. Bingham first restated his opponent's position
that by regulating private conduct the federal government would be
invading the reserved powers of the states, and then responded to it:
You say it is centralized power to restrain by law unlawful
combinations in States against the Constitution and citizens of the
United States, to enforce the Constitution and the rights of United
States citizen [sic.] by national law, and to disperse by force, if need
be, combinations too powerful to be overcome by judicial process,
engaged in trampling underfoot the life and liberty, or destroying the
property of the citizen.

The States never had the right, though they had the power, to inflict
wrongs upon free citizens by denial of the full protection of the laws;
because all State officials are by the Constitution required to be bound
by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution. As I have already
said, the States, did deny to citizens the equal protection of the laws,
they did deny the rights of citizens under the Constitution, and except
to the extent of the express limitations upon the States, as I have
shown, the citizen had no remedy. They denied trial by jury, and he
had no remedy. They took property without compensation, and he had
no remedy. They restricted the freedom of the press, and he had no
remedy. They restricted the freedom of speech, and he had no remedy.
They restricted the rights of conscience, and he had no remedy. They
bought and sold men who had no remedy. Who dare say, now that the
Constitution has been amended, that the nation cannot by law provide
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against all such abuses and denials261of right as these in States and by
States, or combinations of persons?
The House
Committee
on Reconstruction,
chaired by
Representative Benjamin F. Butler, concurred. In a report issued to
Congress in February 1871, after describing a series of murders and
assaults committed against black citizens in a number of states, the
Committee expressed its opinion regarding Congress's power to address
the problem:
The fourteenth amendment of the Constitution also has vested in the
Congress of the United States the power, by proper legislation, to
prevent any State from depriving any citizen of the United States of the
enjoyment of life, liberty, and property. But it is said that this
deprivation.., is not done by the State but by the citizens of the State.
But surely, if the fact is as your committee believe and assert it to be,
that the State is powerless to prevent such murders and felonies...
from being daily and hourly committed in every part of the designated
States, and if, added to that, comes the inability of the State to punish
the crimes after they are committed, then the State has, by its neglect
or want of power, deprived the citizens of the United States of
protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property as fully
and
262
completely as if it had passed a legislative act to the same effect.
Many other members of the Reconstruction Congress expressed
their belief that Congressional power extended to private conduct that
interfered with fundamental rights.263 Senator John Pool stated:
[I]ndividuals may prevent the exercise of the right of suffrage;
individuals may prevent the enjoyment of other rights which are
conferred upon the citizen by the fourteenth amendment, as well as
trespass upon the right conferred by the fifteenth. Not only citizens, but
organizations of citizens, conspiracies, may be and are, as we are told,
in some of the states formed for that purpose.264
Senator Pool supported the adoption of legislation directed against this
conduct.265 Representative and future President James A. Garfield
declared that "it is undoubtedly within the power of Congress to provide
261. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1871), reprintedin Avins, supra note 119, at 511.
262. See H.R. REP. No. 41-37, at 4 (1871) (statement of Rep. Butler), reprinted in Avins, supra
note 119, at 472.

263.
Congress
264.
447.
265.

See generally SCATURRO, supra note 126, at 85-109 (quoting numerous members of
to this effect).
CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3611 (1870), reprinted in Avins, supra note 119, at
Id.
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by law for the punishment of all persons, official or private, who shall
invade these rights, and who by violence, threats, or intimidation shall
deprive any citizen of their fullest enjoyment. ''266 But Congress was not
assuming the power to punish all crimes committed by private parties;
rather, the legislation enacted by the Reconstruction Congress reached
only those actions which interfere with fundamental, constitutional
rights. In explaining the scope of the proposed Ku Klux Klan Act,
Senator George Edmunds of Vermont stated that the bill would not
punish "a private conspiracy growing out of a neighborhood feud" but
that it could reach such conduct "if ...this conspiracy was formed
against [a] man because he was a Democrat,... or because he was a

Catholic, or because
he was a Methodist, or because he was a
67
,, 2
Vermonter ...
Even more persuasive than what the framers said is what they did.
The Reconstruction Congress enacted a number of civil rights laws,
some directed at state action, but more often directed at private action, in
an attempt to redress and correct the vicious and widespread abuses
being carried out by those who wished to oppress the black race and to
return them to a state of virtual slavery. Among the laws adopted by
Congress during Reconstruction and directed against the actions of
private individuals or organizations were the Civil Rights Act of 1866,268
the Ku Klux Klan Act, 269 and the Civil Rights Act of 1875.270 Not
surprisingly, in general the same legislators who voted for the
Fourteenth Amendment also supported the enactment of these three civil
rights laws.27 1
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 addressed discrimination in a number
of matters involving state action as well as private action involving the
sale or lease of real property and entering into contracts.2 72 This law,

266.
529.
267.

CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 153 (1871), reprinted in Avins, supra note 119, at
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 567 (1871), reprinted in Avins, supra note 119, at

547.

268. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982
(2000)) (originally entitled "An Act to protect All Persons in the United States in Their Civil Rights,
and furnish the Means of their Vindication").
269.

Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1985,

18 U.S.C. § 241 (2000)) (originally entitled "An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes").
270.

Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, §§ 3-5, 18 Stat. 336, 337 (1875) (codified at 42 U.S.C.

§ 1984 (2000)) (originally entitled "An act to protect all citizens in their civil and legal rights").
271.
272.

See infra notes 275-85 and accompanying text.
See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981

(2000)) (conferring citizenship upon all persons born in the United States, and declaring that all
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now codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982, was originally directed
against persons acting pursuant to state law or custom,273 and it is
presently considered to be fully applicable against private parties. 274
Although this statute was originally enacted before the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted, the legislative history is replete with
references indicating that the Fourteenth Amendment was written and
adopted for the principal purpose of removing any doubts about the
constitutionality of this Act.275 This conclusion is supported by the fact
that the Congress reenacted this law in 1870 after the ratification of the

citizens have the same right as white citizens "to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and
give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property" and that
they "shall be subject to like punishment, pains," and "penalties").
273. See id. § 2 (imposing penalty upon "any person who, under color of any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, or custom, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State
or Territory to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by this act"); see also Robert J.
Kaczorowski, The Enforcement Provisionsof the Civil Rights Act of 1866: A Legislative History in
Light of Runyon v. McCrary, 98 YALE L.J. 565, 585 (1989) ("When they inserted 'custom,' they
meant custom.").
274. See infra notes 306-08 and accompanying text (citing cases upholding Section 1 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 under Congress's power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment).
275. See, e.g., Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, The
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI-KENT L. REv. 627, 631 (1994)
[hereinafter Aynes, Constricting] ("A minority Republican view, represented by Fourteenth
Amendment author John A. Bingham, adhered to the traditional antislavery 'non enforcement'
doctrine and saw the Fourteenth Amendment as the way to cure this 'defect' in the Constitution.");
Richard L. Aynes, The Continuing Importance of Congressman John A. Bingham and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REv. 589, 610 (2003) (referring to John Bingham, the
principal drafter of the Fourteenth Amendment, stating that "[w]hile he [Bingham] opposed the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 on constitutional grounds, he saw the Fourteenth Amendment as a cure for
those defects"); DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN

CONSTITUTION 311 (1990) ("[S]everal other speakers noted that they had supported the Civil Rights
Acts and believed it to be constitutional, but were supporting the [Fourteenth] amendment to
remove any possible doubts."). See Heyman, supra note 180, at 553-54. Heyman states:
Most Republicans believed on these grounds that Congress had the constitutional
authority to pass the Civil Rights Act. However, one leading Republican, Representative
Bingham, strongly disagreed, denouncing the Act as an unconstitutional invasion of the
province of the states. Although he believed that the national government should have
the power to ensure protection of fundamental rights, Bingham argued that another
constitutional amendment was necessary to give Congress such power. Some of the
Act's supporters also admitted having doubts about its constitutionality. For this reason,
Republicans decided to draft a constitutional amendment "to make assurance doubly
sure." Equally important, Republicans desired to enshrine the protections of the Civil
Rights Act in the Constitution, where they would be beyond the power of a subsequent
Democratic majority in Congress to repeal.
Id.; see also SCATURRO, supra note 126, at 78-79 (citing and quoting remarks by both supporters
and opponents of Reconstruction to the effect that the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in part
to dispel any doubts as to the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866).
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Fourteenth Amendment. 2 6 Of the thirty-three Senators who voted to
adopt the Fourteenth Amendment, thirty-two of them also voted for the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.277
Another Reconstruction era civil rights law was the Third
Enforcement Act, entitled "An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for
Other Purposes," and commonly referred to as the "Ku Klux Klan
Act., 278 It was directed against the terrorism that was being perpetrated
on a vast scale throughout the South against freedmen and their unionist
allies. 279 Among many other provisions, the Act prescribed civil and
criminal penalties against individuals who conspired to deprive other
persons of equal protection of the laws or equal privileges and
immunities, or to prevent other persons from voting. 280 Nearly every
for the Fourteenth Amendment
member of the Congress who had voted
281
also voted for the Ku Klux Klan Act.
The Civil Rights Act of 1875 was an ambitious measure intended to
remove an obvious and odious form of racial discrimination, namely
exclusion from and segregation within places of public accommodation.
Charles Sumner, the author of the bill, repeatedly introduced it between
276. See Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 144 (1870) ("And be it further
enacted, That the act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and furnish the
means of their vindication, passed April nine, eighteen hundred and sixty-six, is hereby reenacted."); Robert D. Goldstein, Blyew: Variations on a JurisdictionalTheme, 41 STAN. L. REv.
469, 478-79 (1989) ("Congress readopted the [1866] Act as part of the Enforcement Act of 1870,
thereby assuring that the full power of section 5 of the amendment supported the Act's
constitutionality.").
277. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1809 (1866), reprinted in Avins, supra note 119,
at 205 (roll call vote of Senate to overrule President Johnson's veto of Civil Rights Bill); CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3042, reprinted in Avins, supra note 119, at 237 (roll call vote of
Senate to approve Fourteenth Amendment); see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2286,
t
reprinted in Avins, at 211 (1866) (roll call of House to approve 14b Amendment); CONG. GLOBE,
vote
of
House
to overrule President's veto of
(1866),
at
238
(roll
call
Cong.,
1st
Sess.
3149
39th
Civil Rights Act of 1866) (showing that most members of the House who voted for the Fourteenth
Amendment had also voted for the Civil Rights Act of 1866).
278. See SCATURRO, supra note 126, at 11 (referring to the Ku Klux Klan Act as "the most
sweeping legislation to counter Southern violence during Reconstruction").
279. See supra notes 253-55, 268-69 and accompanying text.
280. See MacKinnon, supra note 238, at 154 ("The act under consideration, called the 'Ku
Klux Klan Act,' and titled 'An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, and for Other Purposes,' provided civil remedies in law or equity
for a range of acts undertaken by anyone, official or not, with the goal of denying a citizen the equal
protection of the laws.") (footnotes omitted).
281. See SCATURRO, supra note 126, at 111 ("[A]II members of Congress who had voted for
the [Fourteenth Amendment] in 1866 and were still serving voted for the Ku Klux Klan
Act... except for [Lyman] Trumbull.. . and three others, all of whom.., were recorded as absent
or not voting for the bill.").
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1871 and 1875, and although he did not live to see its passage, his fight
for this bill was "the last great struggle of his life. 282 This statute
provided:
Whereas, it is essential to just government we recognize the equality of
all men before the law, and hold that it is the duty of government in its
dealings with the people to mete out equal and exact justice to all, of
whatever nativity, race, color, or persuasion, religious or political; and
it being the appropriate object of legislation to enact great fundamental
principles into law: Therefore, Be it enacted..., That all persons

within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full
and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities,
and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters,
and other places of public amusement; subject only to the conditions
and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of
every race
and color, regardless of any previous condition of
28 3
servitude.

This statute imposed civil and criminal penalties upon "any person" who
denied the "full enjoyment" of any of these public accommodations to
any other person.284 Once again, the vast majority of members of
Congress who had voted for the Fourteenth Amendment who were still
in Congress voted for the Civil Rights Act of 1875.285
The irresistible conclusion from the legislative history is that the
members of Congress who voted for the Fourteenth Amendment
believed that the Amendment conferred upon them the power to enact

282. MOORFIELD STOREY, CHARLES SUMNER 402 (1900). On his deathbed in March of 1875,
Sumner reportedly exhorted his friend Representative Hoar, "You must take care of the civil rights
bill-my bill, the civil rights bill, don't let it fail." Id.at 430.
283. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
284. Section 2 of the statute provided:
That any person who shall violate the foregoing section by denying to any citizen, except
for reasons by law applicable to citizens of every race and color, and regardless of any
previous condition of servitude, the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations,
advantages, facilities, or privileges in said section enumerated, or by aiding or inciting
such denial, shall, for every such offense, forfeit and pay the sum of five hundred dollars
to the person aggrieved thereby,.... and shall also, for every such offense, be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not less than five
hundred nor more than one thousand dollars, or shall be imprisoned not less than thirty
days nor more than one year ....
Id. § 2.
285. See James W. Fox, Jr., Re-readings and Misreadings: Slaughter-House, Privileges or
Immunities, and Section 5 Enforcement Powers, 91 KY. L.J. 67, 146 (2002) ("Of the twenty-two

members of the Forty-second Congress who voted for the Fourteenth Amendment, twenty-one
supported the Civil Rights Bill; only Senator Trumbull, who was backsliding to his Democratic

roots, opposed it.").
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legislation directed against private action invading fundamental rights.
Despite this evidence, the Supreme Court struck down these laws using
the doctrine of "state action."
C. Supreme Court's Use of the State Action Doctrine to Strike Down
Civil Rights LegislationDuring the Nineteenth Century
Despite the unambiguous intent of the people who framed and
supported the Fourteenth Amendment, in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries the Supreme Court struck down many of the
Reconstruction-era civil rights laws in cases such as Harris v. United
States, 28 6 The Civil Rights Cases,287 Baldwin v. Franks,288 and Hodges v.

United States,289 on the ground that Congress lacked power under the
Fourteenth Amendment to regulate the behavior of private parties.2 90 A
principal argument raised in Congress against the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Reconstruction civil rights laws had
been that they would invade the reserved powers of the states.291 Upon
this point the majority and the minority in Congress disagreed, the
majority believing that Congress should and did have the authority to
286. 106 U.S. 629, 640 (1883) (declaring provision ofKu Klux Klan Act unconstitutional, and
stating, "As, therefore, the section of the law under consideration is directed exclusively against the
action of private persons, without reference to the laws of the states, or their administration by the
officers of the state, we are clear in the opinion that it is not warranted by any clause in the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution").
287. 109 U.S. 3, 24-26 (1883) (striking down federal Civil Rights Act of 1875); see supra
notes 228-33 and accompanying text.
288. 120 U.S. 678, 688 (1887) (following Harris in finding the Ku Klux Klan Act to be
unconstitutional insofar as it applies to private action).
289. 203 U.S. 1, 14 (1906) (overturning convictions of a group of individuals for interfering
with the civil rights of other individuals in violation of Civil Rights Act of 1866, in part because the
statute could not be grounded upon the Fourteenth Amendment, stating, "that the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments do not justify the legislation is also beyond dispute, for they, as repeatedly
held, are restrictions upon state action, and no action on the part of the state is complained of").
290. See notes 220-25; see also supra notes 263-66. See also United States v. Cruikshank, 92
U.S. 542, 542-43 (1876), which recognized the state action doctrine in dictum and stated:
The fourteenth amendment prohibits a state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law, and from denying to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws; but [this provision] adds nothing to the
rights of one citizen as against another. It simply furnishes an additional guaranty against
any encroachment by the states upon the fundamental rights which belong to every
citizen as a member of society. The duty of protecting all its citizens in the enjoyment of
an equality of rights was originally assumed by the States and it still remains there. The
only obligation resting upon the United States is to see that the states do not deny the
right. This the amendment guaranties, but no more. The power of the national
government is limited to the enforcement of this guaranty.
Id.
291. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2006

65

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [2006], Art. 5
HOFS TRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 34:1379

regulate private conduct, the minority asserting that Congress should not
or could not reach private action. 292 In Harris, the Civil Rights Cases,
Baldwin, and Hodges, the same division over state action existed among
the justices of the Supreme Court; however, the majority and minority
were reversed, with the majority importing the "state action doctrine"
into Section 5 and agreeing with those legislators who had opposed the
Fourteenth Amendment and civil rights for African Americans.293
This travesty was compounded by other outrageous decisions from
this period, such as Blyew v. United States,294 United States v. Reese,295

292. See supranote 275 and accompanying text.
293. See SCATUKRO,supra note 126, at 110-11. Scaturro concludes:
In the end, the several theories of the Fourteenth Amendment expressed on the floor
regarding congressional power of individual [action]... do not support the Court's
version of the state action doctrine-unless one decides to embrace the theory endorsed
almost exclusively by Democrats (joined in the 1870s by Liberal Republicans) who
earlier had opposed the amendment out of fear of its expansion of congressional power
in the first place.
Id.; see also id. at 131.
[lI]t is difficult to deny that the Court's opinion in 1883 embraced the views of the
opponents of the Fourteenth Amendment and Reconstruction, not those of its framers
and other supporters.
Id. at 131. See also Richard L. Aynes, Pamela Brandwein, Reconstructing Reconstruction: The
Supreme Court and the Production of Historical Truth, 45 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 98, 98-99 (2001)
(book review). Aynes notes that Brandwein claims:
[T]he majority in the case embraced the Democratic view of the problem of slavery,
while the dissenters articulated opinions consistent with the Republican view of the
problem of slavery. This may, at first, seem counterintuitive, since eight of the nine
justices had been appointed by Republican presidents. However, in addition to her own
strong claims, there are other facts that seem to support Brandwein's conclusion. The
solid Democrat, Buchanan appointee, and doughface Nathan Clifford voted with the
majority. His vote should at least raise the question of whether the majority
interpretation was what the adopters of the Amendment intended. Justice Samuel Miller,
who wrote the majority opinion, had privately supported President Andrew Johnson's
effort to pass a conservative, alternative fourteenth amendment, apparently implying
Miller's own opposition to the Fourteenth Amendment actually adopted. In contrast, we
know that dissenters Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase and Justice Stephen Field both
supported the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, Justice Noah H.
Swayne's dissenting opinion in very consistent with the Republican theories articulated
in Congress, as is the dissent of Justice Joseph P. Bradley.
ld
294. 80 U.S. 581, 592-94 (1871) (giving Section 3 of Civil Rights Act of 1866 narrow
construction, denying jurisdiction of federal court to hear murder case where Kentucky law
prohibited blacks from testifying as witnesses to crime committed by whites, viz., the murder of an
elderly black woman witnessed by members of her family).
295. 92 U.S. 214, 236-38 (1876) (construing Section 3 of the first Enforcement Act broadly, so
as to render it unconstitutional as beyond Congress's power to enact under the Fifteenth
Amendment); see also SCATURRO, supra note 126, at 41-49.
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The Slaughter-House Cases,2 96 United States v. Cruikshank,297 Plessy v.
Ferguson,298 Williams v. Mississippi, 299 and Gong Lum v. Rice, 300 all of
which narrowly interpreted the Reconstruction Amendments or
Reconstruction civil rights statutes. The opinions of the Supreme Court
in all of these cases are marked by intellectual dishonesty3 ' and, in my
opinion, collectively represent a moral failure amounting to complicity

296. 83 U.S. 36, 73-80 (1873) (narrowly construing the privileges and immunities of national
citizenship protected from state interference by the Fourteenth Amendment as excluding the
fundamental rights); see id. at 74 (drawing a distinction between the privileges and immunities of
state citizenship and the privileges and immunities of national citizenship, and stating that "[i]t is
quite clear ...that there is a citizenship of the United States, and a citizenship of a State, which are
distinct from each other, and which depend upon different characteristics or circumstances in the
individual").
297. 92 U.S. 542, 549 (1876) (following Slaughterhouse in narrowly construing privileges and
immunities of national citizenship, finding that right to assemble is not a right of national
citizenship).
298. 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896) (upholding Louisiana statute requiring separate railroad cars
for blacks and whites).
299. 170 U.S. 213, 221-22 (1898) (upholding provisions of Mississippi constitution and laws
such as poll tax, literacy test, disqualification for certain crimes, and residency requirements, which
were designed to disqualify African Americans from voting); see also WOODWARD, supra note 189,
at 71 ("[In Williams v. Mississippi the Court completed the opening of the legal road to
proscription, segregation, and disenfranchisement by approving the Mississippi plan for depriving
Negroes of the franchise.").
300. 275 U.S. 78, 85-87 (1927) (upholding Mississippi statute requiring separation of the races
in the public schools).
301. See Aynes, Constricting, supra note 275, at 644, 646-48 (describing Justice Miller's
"deliberate misquotation" of both the Constitution and a judicial opinion in the majority opinion of
the Slaughterhouse Cases); id at 644, 648-49 (describing Miller's "woeful ignorance or duplicity"
in his failure to mention the definition of citizenship contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1866);
Goldstein, supra note 276, at 480-83 (describing how Court in Blyew found that federal courts did
not have jurisdiction over criminal case where victims of racist murders and their family members
were denied the right to testify as witnesses in state courts, because neither victims nor witnesses
were "affected" by the discriminatory state laws). Compare Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551 ("We consider
the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced
separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not
by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that
construction upon it."), with id at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Every one knows that the statute in
question had its origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars
occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white
persons.... No one would be so wanting in candor as to assert the contrary."). See also SCATURRO,
supra note 126, at 49 (criticizing the reasoning of the majority in Reese for choosing to construe the
federal statute in such a manner as to render it unconstitutional, and describing the rule of decision
as "a judicially created anomaly that conveniently conformed to the national attitude toward
Reconstruction."); id. at 52-53 (criticizing the opinion of the Court in Cruikshank for failing to
acknowledge that election of November 4, 1872 was a Presidential election, thereby supplying a
jurisdictional element, and overlooking the national notoriety of the Colfax massacre).
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with racism. 30 2 The Senate of the United States has now issued a formal
apology for its failure to stem the tide of lynching that occurred during
the era of Jim Crow. 30 3 However, the Supreme Court of the United
States bears even more responsibility than the Congress for the abuses of
that period, because it not only failed to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment in protection of black citizens, but it also struck down the
federal laws which were adopted during Reconstruction and were
intended to protect the civil rights of black citizens. The Reconstruction
era civil rights laws, had they been upheld and enforced, would have
deterred and perhaps prevented lynching as well as discrimination and
segregation. Not only should the Supreme Court, like the Senate,
apologize to the American people, but it also has the moral obligation to
recognize its responsibility by reversing its crabbed interpretation of
Congress's power to enact protective legislation under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In 1954, the Supreme Court revived the Equal Protection Clause in
3 °4
its landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education,
overruling
30 5
Plessy,
and in the 1960s, the Court made partial restitution for its
grievous error in applying the state action doctrine to restrict the power
of Congress under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by
expanding its interpretation of Congress's power to enact civil rights
legislation under other provisions of the Constitution. In Jones v. Alfred
Mayer Co. 3 06 and Runyon v. McCrary30 7 the Court ruled that Section 1 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was constitutional under Section 2 of the
302. See WOODWARD, supra note 189, at 70-71 (citing many of the same cases, and stating,
"[t]he cumulative weakening of resistance to racism was expressed also in a succession of decisions
by the United States Supreme Court between 1873 and 1898").
303. See Jacqueline Goldsby, The Resolution Obscures How Widespread the U.S.
Government's Complicity in Lynching Actually Was, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 21, 2005 at 41 ("The

U.S. Senate has apologized for its role in the nearly 5,000 lynching murders of African Americans
by white lynch mobs between 1882 and 1968. As their resolution admits, their predecessors
repeatedly turned back legislation that would have designated lynching a federal crime.").
304. 347 U.S 483, 493-94 (1954) (striking down the doctrine of "separate but equal" as applied
to the public schools).
305. See id. at 494-95 ("Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the
time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modem authority. Any language in
Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.").

306. 392 U.S. 409, 443-44 (1968) (upholding power of Congress, under Section 2 of Thirteenth
Amendment, to adopt portion of Section I of Civil Rights Act of 1866 presently codified at 42

U.S.C. § 1982, as applied to private act of discrimination in the sale of real estate).
307.

427 U.S. 160, 185-86 (1976) (upholding power of Congress, under Section 2 of Thirteenth

Amendment, to adopt portion of Section 1 of Civil Rights Act of 1866 presently codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1981, as applied to refusal of private school to enter in contract on account of race); see
also Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 465-66 (1975) (upholding application of 42

U.S.C. § 1981 as applied to private act of employment discrimination).
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Thirteenth Amendment. 3 0 8 In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States30 9 and Katzenbach v. McClung3l° the Court held that the Public
Accommodations Act of 1964 was properly enacted pursuant to
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. 3 11 And in United States
v. Guest 312 the Court held that Congress has the authority to prohibit
private interference with the constitutional right to travel.313
However, there are serious drawbacks to this roundabout method of
defining Congress's power to enact civil rights legislation, instead of

308. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 441-43 (finding private discrimination in the sale of real estate to
be a badge or incident of slavery). The Jones Court explains:
Just as the Black Codes, enacted after the Civil War to restrict the free exercise of those
rights, were substitutes for the slave system, so the exclusion of Negroes from white
communities became a substitute for the Black Codes. And when racial discrimination
herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to buy property turn on the color of their
skin, then it too is a relic of slavery.
see also Runyon, 427 U.S. at 179. The Runyon Court states:
Id.;
Section 1981, as applied to the conduct at issue here, constitutes an exercise of federal
legislative power under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment ....The prohibition of racial
discrimination that interferes with the making and enforcement of contracts for private
educational services furthers goals closely analogous to those served by § 1981 's
elimination of racial discrimination in the making of private employment contracts and,
more generally, by § 1982's guarantee that "a dollar in the hands of a Negro will
purchase the same thing as a dollar in the hands of a white man."
Runvon, 427 U.S. at 179 (quoting Jones, 392 U.S. at 443) (footnote omitted).
309. 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding public accommodations provisions of Civil Rights Act of
1964 as proper exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause).
310. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
311. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 261 ("We, therefore, conclude that the action of
the Congress in the adoption of the Act as applied here to a motel which concededly serves
interstate travelers is within the power granted it by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, as
interpreted by this Court for 140 years."); McClung, 379 U.S. at 300 ("We believe that this
testimony afforded ample basis for the conclusion that established restaurants in such areas sold less
interstate goods because of the discrimination, that interstate travel was obstructed directly by it,
that business in general suffered and that many new businesses refrained from establishing there as
a result of it.").
312. 383 U.S. 745, 758-60 (1966) (upholding 42 U.S.C. § 241 as applied to conspiracy by
individuals to interfere with other persons' constitutional right to travel).
313. See id. at 760 ("[l]f the predominant purpose of the conspiracy is to impede or prevent the
exercise of the right of interstate travel, or to oppress a person because of his exercise of that right,
then, whether or not motivated by racial discrimination, the conspiracy becomes a proper object of
the federal law under which the indictment in this case was brought."); see also id. at 759 (declining
to identify the precise textual basis for the constitutional right to travel, stating that "[a]lthough there
have been recurring differences in emphasis within the Court as to the source of the constitutional
right of interstate travel, there is no need here to canvass those differences further" because "[a]ll
have agreed that the right exists") (footnote omitted); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501 (1999)
(striking down California statute that interfered with citizens' constitutional right to travel and in
dictum noting that the right to travel interstate, though not expressly mentioned in the Constitution,
is constitutionally protected, stating, "[flor the purposes of this case, therefore, we need not identify
the source of that particular right in the text of the Constitution").
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simply grounding the power in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
as the framers intended. The scope of each of the alternative foundations
of Congressional power-the Thirteenth Amendment, the Commerce
Clause, and the privileges and immunities of national citizenship-is
very narrow, and each provision confers very limited powers upon the

Congress.
The Thirteenth Amendment is applicable to private parties, 314 and
Section 2 of Thirteenth Amendment has been interpreted as authorizing
Congress to eliminate the "badges and incidents of slavery."3 15 This term
has been construed to include private acts of racial discrimination in
entering into contracts 316 and the sale of real estate, 317 but it may not
include segregation in places of public accommodation. 318 A more
serious shortcoming is that, while the Thirteenth Amendment may be
used as a basis for combating acts of racial discrimination, it has no
application to other forms of discrimination, such as discrimination
based upon gender, disability, or sexual orientation.3 19
Another basis of Congressional power to prevent private
interference with constitutional rights is the implied power to protect the
rights of citizens of the United States. For example, the Supreme Court
314. See Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438 (1968) ("It has never been... 'that the
power vested in Congress to enforce [the Thirteenth Amendment] by appropriate
legislation' .. . includes the power to enact laws 'direct and primary, operating upon the acts of
individuals, whether sanctioned by State legislation or not."') (citation omitted).
315. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) ("[lit is assumed that the power
vested in congress to enforce the article by appropriate legislation, clothes congress with power to
pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United
States ....); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 192 (1989) (citing Jones v. Alfred
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 420-21 (1968)).
316. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179 (1976) (refusal of private school to enter into
contract on account of race constitutes badge or incident of slavery, stating, "Section 1981, as
applied to the conduct at issue here, constitutes an exercise of federal legislative power under § 2 of
the Thirteenth Amendment"). Cf Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975)
("Although this Court has not specifically so held, it is well settled among the Federal Courts of
Appeals-and we now join them-that § 1981 affords a federal remedy against discrimination in
private employment on the basis of race.").
317. Jones, 392 U.S. at 439 (1968) (private act of discrimination in the sale of real estate
constitutes badge or incident of slavery, asking the question of whether "the authority of Congress
to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment 'by appropriate legislation' include[s] the power to eliminate
all racial barriers to the acquisition of real and personal property" and answering: "We think the
answer to that question is plainly yes").
318. See supra note 333 and accompanying text.
319. See Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic and State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 796 n.3 (W.D. Va.
1996) ("The Thirteenth Amendment applies to racial, not gender, discrimination."). But see
generally Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude and the
Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 207 (1992) (arguing that the Thirteenth
Amendment can be used to protect battered women).
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has upheld federal legislation prohibiting individuals from interfering
with the national right to travel interstate. 320 The problem with this
theory is that the Supreme Court has given a very narrow reading to the
rights of national citizenship. In the Slaughter-House Cases, the
Supreme Court ruled that the rights of state citizenship include "civil
rights" or rights which are "fundamental," 321 while the rights of national
citizenship include rights which are implied from the fact that "we are
one people, with one common country, 322 such as the right to petition
the federal government; the right of access to seaports, federal buildings
and agencies; the right to federal protection while on the high seas or in
foreign nations; and the right to traverse the navigable waters of the
United States.323 Later decisions of the Supreme Court have recognized
the right to travel interstate as a fundamental right of American
citizenship. 324 Accordingly, even though the Court has ruled that
Congress lacks the authority to regulate the action of private parties as a
violation of rights under Equal Protection, 325 Congress does have the
power to prohibit private parties from interfering with the right to
travel.326
Finally, in United States v. Lopez327 the Supreme Court interpreted
the Commerce Clause as conferring upon Congress the power to regulate
private individuals and companies who are engaged in interstate
320. See supra notes 312-13 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745 (1966), and Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999)).
321. 83 U.S. 36, 76 (1873) (referring to the rights of state citizenship, and stating that "[t]hey
are, in the language of Judge Washington, those rights which are fundamental"); id at 82.
But, however pervading this sentiment, and however it may have contributed to the
adoption of the amendments we have been considering, we do not see in those
amendments any purpose to destroy the main features of the general system. Under the
pressure of all the excited feeling growing out of the war, our statesmen have still
believed that the existence of the States with powers for domestic and local government,
including the regulation of civil rights-the rights of person and of property-was
essential to the perfect working of our complex form of government, though they have
thought proper to impose additional limitations on the States, and to confer additional
power on that of the Nation.
Id.
322. Id at 79.
323. See id.at 79-80 (listing, by way of obiter dictum, the privileges and immunities of
national citizenship).
324. See supra notes 312-13 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745 (1966), and Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999)).
325. See Guest, 383 U.S. at 755 ("It is a commonplace that rights under the Equal Protection
Clause itself arise only where there has been involvement of the State or of one acting under the
color of its authority.").
326. See id. at 757-60 (upholding federal statute as applied to private interference with right to
travel).
327. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2006

71

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [2006], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 34:1379

commerce or in an activity which, in the aggregate, affects interstate
commerce. 32 8 However, the Court implicitly distinguished economic
from non-economic activity in ruling that Congress has the power to
regulate non-commercial activity only if the activity has a substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce. 329 Accordingly, under the
Commerce Clause, although Congress has the power to address
discrimination in access to places of public accommodation, 330 it does
not have the power to redress non-economic wrongs. In accordance with
this view, the Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Morrison that
because violence against women was not an economic activity, Congress
lacked authority under the Commerce33Clause to enact a law addressing
the problem of gender-based violence. 1
Another objection to the penchant of the Court for basing the
authority for civil rights legislation on constitutional provisions other
than the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is that the
judicial reasoning justifying these alternative sources of authority seems
strained. Every year that our society is further removed from the
memories and the horrors of slavery, the argument that acts of
discrimination are "badges and incidents of slavery" becomes
psychologically weaker. In 1883, more than a century ago but less than
two decades after the end of the Civil War, a majority of the Supreme
Court impatiently declared that "it would be running the slavery
argument into the ground" to contend that acts of racial segregation were
328. See id. at 558-59.
[W]e have identified three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under
its commerce power. First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the
threat may come only from intrastate activities. Finally, Congress' commerce authority
includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate
commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce ....
Id. (citations omitted).
329. See id. at 561 (striking down federal Gun Free School Zones Act on ground that
possession of firearms in a school zone does not have a substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce, and stating that the Act "is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with
'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms,"
that the Act "is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated," and that "[ilt
cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or
are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects
interstate commerce").
330. See supra notes 309-11 and accompanying text.
331. See 529 U.S. 528, 617 (2000) ("We accordingly reject the argument that Congress may
regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on
interstate commerce.").
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remnants of slavery.332 As for Congress's power to protect the rights of
national citizenship, these rights are so narrow and so limited, and so
dependent upon a case so discredited as Slaughter-House, that reliance
upon this power seems a slender reed indeed.333 And as for Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause, the true object of civil rights
legislation is not to regulate commerce, but rather to protect rights that
are guaranteed to all persons under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Consequently, reliance upon the Commerce Clause as a foundation of
civil rights legislation seems pretextual.334 The Court's failure to
concede that Congress is constitutionally authorized to protect all of our
fundamental rights from private interference is, in and of itself, a serious
breach of the respect that is due to a coordinate branch. It is insulting to
Congress for the Court to say that Congress has the power to outlaw
discrimination in places of public accommodation only because
discrimination is bad for business. And it is embarrassing to all
Americans for the Court to say that Congress does not have plenary
power to protect our basic human rights. In Heart of Atlanta Motel, the
Supreme Court left open the door that the civil rights legislation under
consideration might be sustained upon grounds other than the Commerce
Clause.335 The Supreme Court ought to revisit the question of Congress's
power to enact protections for civil rights.
D. Critique ofUnited States v. Morrison
In place of the half-measures used by the Supreme Court,
authorizing Congress to enact civil rights laws under the Thirteenth
Amendment, the Citizenship Clause, and the Commerce Clause, the
Court should have simply overruled the racist decisions of the post-Civil
332. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24-25 (1883) ("It would be running the slavery
argument into the ground to make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit
to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach or cab or
car, or admit to his concert or theater, or deal with in other matters of intercourse or business.").
333. See supra notes 296-303 and accompanying text (discussing and criticizing the Court's
decision in the Slaughter-House Cases).
334. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 359 (1819) (noting that Congress's exercise of
the commerce power could not be undertaken for other purposes because "comparing the means
with the proposed end, will decide, whether the connection is real, or assumed as the pretext for the
usurpation of powers not belonging to the government").
335. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) ("Our study of
the legislative record, made in the light of prior cases, has brought us to the conclusion that
Congress possessed ample power [to enact this legislation under the Commerce Clause], and we
have therefore not considered the other grounds relied upon. This is not to say that the remaining
authority upon which it acted was not adequate, a question upon which we do not pass, but merely
that since the commerce power is sufficient for our decision here we have considered it alone.").
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War era wherein the Court had stripped Congress of the power that the
Nation granted to it under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
However, instead of overruling those shameful precedents, the Supreme
Court, led by the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist, chose to resurrect
them. In United States v. Morrison, the Chief Justice cited and followed
Cruikshank, Harris, and the Civil Rights Cases in support of his
conclusion that Congress is without power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to regulate the actions of private parties.336
Justice Breyer, in dissent in Morrison, made the modest argument
that federal civil rights laws are "congruent with" and "proportionate to"
state failures to enact or enforce their own laws protecting citizens in
their basic rights. 337 This is only one of a number of theories that could
be utilized to justify the enactment of federal civil rights laws directed
against individuals under the Fourteenth Amendment. Framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment also argued, for example, that a state's failure to
338tino
th
act constituted a denial of equal protection,
or a violation of the
citizen's constitutional right of protection.339 Whatever analytical model
is utilized, at least some private action-private action that infringes
upon fundamental constitutional rights-should be subject to
Congressional protection. This interpretation of Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment would lack the simplicity and clarity of the
present bright-line rule against federal laws affecting private action. But
it is the right decision-right morally, right historically, and right
jurisprudentially.
The people of this nation fought a ferocious and devastating civil
war because a number of state governments had failed to protect
people's basic civil rights from the actions of both public officials and
private individuals. 340 The decision of the Supreme Court in the Civil
Rights Cases, stripping away the power of Congress to protect the rights
of citizens against private action, was a cynical betrayal of the sacrifices
336. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621-22 (citing and quoting Harris, the Civil Rights Cases, and
Cruikshank); see also Newman & Gass, supra note 227, at 26 (stating that the opinion of Chief
Justice Rehnquist in Morrison "not only revived racist decisions [such as Cruikshank and Harris] as
valid authority but declared that they deserved more respect than other precedents").
337. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 665 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (concluding that the Violence
Against Women Act was proportionate to and congruent with the failure of state governments to
provide an adequate remedy for gender-based violence).
338. See source cited supra note 123 and accompanying text (citing remarks of Senator John
Pool); see also SCATURRO, supra note 126, at 92 (quoting remarks of Representative Jeremiah M.
Wilson to effect that when a state fails to enact or enforce protective laws, it is a denial of equal
protection, which empowers the Congress to enact laws to secure equal protection).
339. See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
340. See CURTIS, supra note 185, at 299.
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of that war. It is long past time to undo this injustice and overrule the
decision of the Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases, and to adopt
instead the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan as the proper
interpretation of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 34' The state
action doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment stands for the right of the
majority of the American people, acting through their federal
representatives, to enact legislation to lift the standards of behavior
among individuals above the constitutional baseline. Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment should be interpreted as authorizing Congress to
protect our fundamental rights from both public and private interference.
The following portion of this Article describes two theoretical
frameworks that I believe provide an appropriate context for
understanding the state action doctrine: the contradiction that Alexander
Bickel dubbed the "countermajoritarian difficulty," and John Hart Ely's
response to Bickel, the theory of "representation-reinforcement."
VII.

BICKEL'S DILEMMA AND ELY'S SOLUTION

Professor Gary L. McDowell has observed that "[t]o an
extraordinary degree the work of Alexander Bickel remains the rubric
under which most contemporary constitutional theorizing has taken
place. 342 Professor Bickel identified a fundamental contradiction at the
heart of constitutional law which he called the "counter-majoritarian
difficulty. '343 Bickel described this dilemma in these terms: "[W]hen the
Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of
an elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual
people of the here and now; it exercises
control, not in behalf of the
344
it."
against
but
majority,
prevailing
Bickel's thesis is based upon the principle that the people in
America are sovereign. One of the fundamental truths that this nation
was founded upon is that all just powers of government "are derived
from the consent of the governed., 345 Pursuant to this principle, "[w]e,
the people of the United States ' 346 adopted the Constitution of the
United States, which installed a representative democracy as the
341. See Amar, supra note 238, at 619-20 (criticizing the Supreme Court for failing to adopt
the reasoning of the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan in the Civil Rights Cases).
342.
343.

GARY L. MCDOWELL, CURBING THE COURTS 63-64 (1988).
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962) ("The root difficulty

is that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our system.").
344. Id.at 16-17.
345.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (1776).

346. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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government of the people. The Congress and the President are the
servants of the people and are elected to enact and enforce the laws on
behalf of the people.347 They are answerable to the people and are
removable at the times of regularly scheduled elections. 348 In addition,
349
the President may be impeached by the representatives of the people.
Although the Constitution establishes and installs a democratic
form of government, constitutional law may be thought of as the
antithesis of democracy. The Constitution becomes significant precisely
when the representatives of the people overstep their bounds and commit
some act that is forbidden by the Constitution. Every time a law or an
official policy is declared unconstitutional, the will of the people, as
expressed through the democratic process, is thwarted.35 ° Professor
Bickel's conundrum, the counter-majoritarian difficulty, was anticipated
a century-and-a-half earlier by Chief Justice John Marshall. In Marbury
v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall observed that the crucial question in
constitutional law is whether "written constitutions are absurd attempts,
on the part of the people, to limit a power, in its own nature
illimitable."35' 1
Professor Bickel attempted to reconcile the conflict between
democracy and constitutional law by an appeal to morality. He explained
that constitutional law must respect "the morality of government by
consent" as well as ensuring "moral self-government.' 35 2 In short, the
347. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
348. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl.1 (requiring that members of the House of Representatives
be elected every two years); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl.I (requiring that members of the Senate be
elected every six years); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.1 (requiring that the President be elected every
four years).
349. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (authorizing impeachment for "treason, bribery, or other high
crimes and misdemeanors").
350.

See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 4-5

(1980)

[hereinafter ELY,

DEMOCRACY] (describing the "central problem" ofjudicial review under the Constitution as the fact
that "a body that is not elected or otherwise politically responsible in any significant way is telling
the people's elected representatives that they cannot govern as they'd like").
351. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
352. BICKEL, supra note 343, 199-200 (1980) (observing that American society is "dedicated
both to the morality of government by consent and to moral self-government"). Other leading
scholars also point to "morality" as the cornerstone of constitutional law. See RONALD DWORKIN,
supra note 31, at vii, 143, 147 (1977) (calling for a "fusion of constitutional law and moral theory"
and stating that "[a] claim of right presupposes a moral argument and can be established in no other
way"); MICHAEL PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 99, 112 (1982)
(contending that the Court should interpret the Constitution in a way that is "faithful with the notion
of moral evolution" and urging the Court to foster "a new moral order"); Frank Michelman, Politics
and Values or What's Really Wrong with Rationality Review, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 487, 509, 402
(1979). See generally MCDOWELL, supra note 342, at 15-37 (describing the moral frameworks
developed by these and other constitutional scholars).
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Constitution must both preserve the moral right of the people to govern
themselves democratically, and it must place curbs upon the immoral
exercise of power by democratic government. However, Professor
Bickel never persuasively identified where the line between "the
morality of government by consent" and "moral self-government" must
be drawn.353
The constitutional theorist John Hart Ely, who described Bickel as
"probably the most creative constitutional theorist of the past twenty
years,, 354 proposed an elegant solution to Bickel's paradox of judicial
supremacy within a democratic society. Ely suggested that the
predominant purpose of judicial review under the Constitution is to
safeguard the democratic process. In other words, in any case where
laws or public policies interfere with the proper or efficient working of
the political process, the courts are justified in stepping in to restore
balance. Ely called this theory of constitutional interpretation
"representation-reinforcement," 355 and summarized that "unblocking
stoppages in the democratic process is what judicial review ought
356
preeminently to be about ....
Like Bickel's concept of the "majoritarian difficulty," Ely's theory
of "representation-reinforcement" found early expression in a
foundational opinion by Chief Justice John Marshall. While Bickel's
dilemma was the focus of Marbury v. Madison,357 Ely's theory was at
3 58
the core of Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland.
In McCulloch, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality
of a Maryland statute that placed a tax upon notes issued by the Bank of
the United States. 359 The Court declared that the law was
unconstitutional because the people of the State of Maryland had no
power to tax the functions of the government of the United States. 361

353. See ELY, DEMOCRACY, supra note 350, at 71 (noting that Bickel "ran the gamut of
fundamental-value methodologies").
354. Id.at7l.

355. Id.at 87 ("The remainder of this chapter will comprise three arguments in favor of a
participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review.").
356. Id. at 117.
357. See supranote 351 and accompanying text.
358. 17 U.S.316 (1819).

359. See id.at 425 (after finding that the government of the United States had the power to
establish a Bank of the United States, describing an issue to be decided as "[w]hether the state of
Maryland may, without violating the constitution, tax that branch?").
360. See id at 429. The Court stated:
The sovereignty of a state extends to everything which exists by its own authority, or is
introduced by its permission; but does it extend to those means which are employed by
congress to carry into execution powers conferred on that body by the people of the
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Chief Justice Marshall described the organs of the federal government as
having been created "by all for the benefit of all,"3 61 and accordingly, the
Court ruled that the notes of the Bank of the United States were immune
from taxation by the states. Ely cited the Court's362
reasoning in McCulloch
representation.
of
principle
the
of
as an example
Using the theory of representation-reinforcement, Ely attempted to
construct an overarching theory of constitutional interpretation. In doing
so, Ely took a broad view of what comprises adequate representation. He
did not suggest that the courts should limit judicial review to oversight
of the electoral process, but rather he believed that the courts had the
obligation to protect minorities from oppressive legislation, stating that
"judicial intervention becomes appropriate when the existing processes
of representation seem inadequately fitted to the representation 363
of
minority interests, even minority interests that are not voteless."
However, Ely was skeptical about other formulas for identifying
fundamental rights. For example, he rejected the doctrine of substantive
due process.364 Although he personally favored legislation guaranteeing
women the right to terminate a pregnancy, he believed that Roe v. Wade
was wrongly decided.365 In particular, he did not believe that the
Supreme Court should have balanced women's
right to privacy against
366
the interest of the state in protecting fetal life.
United States? We think it demonstrable, that it does not. Those powers are not given by
the people of a single state. They are given by the people of the United States, to a
government whose laws, made in pursuance of the constitution, are declared to be
supreme. Consequently, the people of a single state cannot confer a sovereignty which
will extend over them.
Id.
361. Marshall repeatedly expressed this "of... by... for" theme. See id. at 404-05 ("The
government of the Union, then... is, emphatically and truly, a government of the people. In form,
and in substance, itemanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised
directly on them, and for their benefit."); id.at 405 ("[T]he government of the Union, though
limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action. This would seem to result, necessarily,
from its nature. It is the government of all; its powers are delegated by all; it represents all, and acts
for all."). Forty-four years later President Abraham Lincoln would echo Marshall's words in the last
line of the Gettysburg Address, declaring that the sacrifices of the Civil War had been made so that
the "government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth."
Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863).
362. See ELY, DEMOCRACY, supra note 350, at 85-86 (discussing the significance of
McCulloch to the theory of representation).
363. Id. at 86.
364. See id. at 18 ("[T]here is simply no avoiding the fact that the word that follows 'due' is
'process."').
365. See JOHN HART ELY, ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND 305 (1996) (describing himself as
"pro-choice," yet opposed to the Court's decision in Roe).
366. See id. at 285 (stating that "the Court has no business getting into that business" of
"second-guessing legislative balances").
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Although Ely mounted a compelling argument that representationreinforcement is an important function of judicial review under the
Constitution, it is not tenable to maintain that representationreinforcement is the only proper function of judicial review. 367 The
Preamble of the Constitution lists a number of other purposes that the
Constitution is intended to serve:
We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect
Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the
common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the
blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do 368
ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
Consequently, representation-reinforcement is only one purpose that the
Constitution serves. The Constitution also creates a single unified nation
with a government that is capable of defending the people and achieving
common goals; it attempts to diffuse governmental power within that
nation; and it protects basic freedoms. Furthermore, the consequences of
restricting the scope of our fundamental rights to "representationreinforcement" would be severe. The right to individual privacy, for
example, is wholly outside the scope of representation-reinforcement.
Moreover, it is difficult to perceive how representation-reinforcement
could protect freedom of expression beyond political speech. However,
Ely's theory of representation-reinforcement serves as a compelling, if
partial, answer to Bickel's dilemma. In addition, it provides a reliable
touchstone for interpreting the state action doctrine.
The framework for understanding the state action doctrine that I
propose in this Article incorporates the theories of both Alexander
Bickel and John Hart Ely. I suggest that the state action doctrine should
be interpreted as preserving a sphere within which the American people
have the unfettered right to govern themselves. I refer to this principle as
"democratic choice," and it is the equivalent of what Bickel called "the
morality of government by consent." Furthermore, I suggest that the
scope of the state action doctrine is limited by democratic principles, and
that it should not be applied in cases where it would weaken the right of
the people to govern themselves. This limitation is consistent with Ely's
theory of "representation-reinforcement."

367.

Ironically, this is the same charge that Ely brought against Hugo Black's theory of "total

incorporation." See ELY, DEMOCRACY, supra note 350, at 28 (rejecting Black's contention that the
only fundamental rights that are applicable against the States are those contained in the Bill of
Rights).
368.

U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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I do not contend that "democratic choice" is the only principle that
the Constitution serves. A number of constitutional doctrines serve other
purposes. For example, the doctrines of procedural and substantive due
process, equal protection, freedom of expression, and freedom of
religion promote liberty, equality, tolerance, and fairness. Still other
doctrines-federalism, separation of powers, the spending clause, the
commerce clause, the dormant commerce clause, and the full faith and
credit clause-are concerned with seeking a balance between the
competing goals of diffusing governmental power and erecting an
effective government within a single, unified nation. However, I do
suggest that preserving democratic choice is the predominant
consideration behind the state action doctrine.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The fundamental value served by the state action doctrine is not
"individual freedom," but rather "democratic choice." The Supreme
Court has failed to recognize this, and as a result, it has misinterpreted
and misapplied the state action doctrine in a number of different
contexts.
In the context of drawing the distinction between state action and
private action, the Supreme Court's belief that the state action doctrine is
designed to preserve individual freedom has influenced the Court to
narrowly construe the concept of state action, thereby failing to properly
control the exercise of state power. In determining whether particular
actions being challenged were state action or private action, Chief
Justice Rehnquist's strict adherence to atomized rules of state action, and
his consequent neglect of the cumulative import of various elements of
governmental involvement, influenced both him and the Court to
underestimate the necessity of applying constitutional norms to the
exercise of combined private and state power.
The Supreme Court has also misconstrued the distinction between
state action and state inaction, because it has failed to focus on the
concept that the state action doctrine is intended to preserve the right of
the people to decide for themselves the extent to which society will
evolve beyond the constitutional baseline. The "no affirmative duty"
doctrine stands for the proposition that the people, acting collectively,
are not required to adopt social welfare programs. However, once
protective laws have been enacted through the democratic process, and
members of the executive branch have been elected or appointed to
enforce those laws, state action exists, and constitutional norms govern
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the execution of those laws. In this context as well, the theme of
"individualism" promoted by Chief Justice Rehnquist led the Court to an
incorrect analysis of the state action doctrine as applied to the obligation
of the government to enforce protective legislation. Therefore, DeShaney
v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services is wrongly
reasoned on state action grounds.
The only line of state action cases whose results are fully consistent
with the principle of democratic choice is the Reitman-Romer line of
authority, which authorizes "mere repeal" of antidiscrimination
legislation, but which prohibits restructuring of the governmental
process to the detriment of minority groups. This line of cases is not
only consistent with the principle of democratic choice, but it also
reinforces and protects the right of the people to democratically choose
how individuals shall treat each other and what governmental benefits
shall be distributed. The reason that these cases do not seem to "fit" with
other aspects of the state action doctrine is that until now it has not been
clear that the concept of democratic choice should be the motivating
principle in all state action cases.
Finally, the principle of democratic choice suggests that the state
action doctrine guarantees that the American people, acting through their
state and federal elected representatives, have the discretion to
determine whether and to what extent individuals and private
organizations have the duty to observe constitutional norms. The state
action doctrine was never intended to inhibit the power of Congress to
protect against private invasions of fundamental rights. That this is true
is apparent from the legislative history surrounding the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the enactment of civil rights laws directed at
private conduct by the Reconstruction Congress. The Civil Rights Cases
and all of the cases which follow in that line, including United States v.
Morrison, are wrongly decided.
Critics from the left have also failed to appreciate that the purpose
of the state action doctrine is to strengthen democracy, and as a result,
they, like the Supreme Court, have also not comprehended the reason for
the distinction between state and private action. The exercise of private
power may be oppressive, but it is up to the people themselves, acting
through the legislature, to determine the conditions under which and the
extent to which private power will be regulated. The state action doctrine
places principal responsibility upon the people to decide whether and to
what extent the fundamental principles of fairness, tolerance, and
equality should govern the actions of private individuals and
organizations.
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For this same reason progressive legal scholars also fail to
appreciate the reason for the distinction between state action and state
inaction. The state action doctrine stands for the proposition that the
people alone have the final say in determining the nature and the degree
of governmental services that they will support with their tax dollars.
Social welfare policy is a matter of legislative grace, not constitutional
right. The only governmental services that the government might be
considered to have an affirmative duty to provide are education-so that
citizens may have the opportunity to participate meaningfully in the
democratic process-and the equal protection of the laws against acts of
private violence.
Once it is understood that the state action doctrine serves and is
controlled by the principle of democratic choice, the errors of both the
Supreme Court and its critics become obvious, and the doctrine emerges
as a rational and coherent building block of our democracy.
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